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“I’ve been betting on it for years . . . . This farm here has been set up
1
for the future.”

INTRODUCTION
What if for every person or business harmed by the effects
of climate change in the next one hundred years, another person or business is benefited by the effects of climate change in
equal magnitude? Although an unlikely scenario, it calls attention to the fact that many people and businesses in the United
States will receive market and nonmarket benefits from climate change, and some may even conclude they are better off—
that they are climate change “winners.” One may ask how there
can be any winners given how disastrous climate change could
be for the global population. But that is the point—even accepting that climate change presents a significant net loss for the
global population, it is not necessarily a net loss for everyone.
Whether you are a climate change winner or loser depends on
your perceptions and circumstances.
The biophysical effects of climate change will be uneven
2
around the globe and within the United States. Some impacts
1. Michael Hill, Surf’s Up, Buffalo: The Good Side of Global Warming,
USA TODAY, June 17, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/
climate/globalwarming/2007-06-14 -warming-winners_N.htm. Chris Loken, a
Hudson Valley apple grower, uttered this response when asked why he diversified his farm to include peach, apricot, and plum trees, crops not usually associated with frosty Upstate New York. Id. The “it,” of course, is climate
change—the 75-year-old Mr. Loken is counting on milder weather. Id.
2. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT passim (2007) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS
REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_
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will open up opportunities for people and businesses to secure
benefits in some areas, such as by increased rainfall, longer
3
growing seasons, and more temperate weather. Some impacts
will open up highly profitable business opportunities in some
areas, such as building seawalls or outfitting warm weather
4
outdoor recreation. Hence, although it most likely is the case
that at global scales the net aggregate economic impacts of cli5
mate change will be negative over time, at local scales there
will be significant variation in impact profiles.
Indeed, many people and businesses will receive benefits of
significant magnitude, enough to lead them to conclude they
are better off because of climate change. Their attitudes about
climate policy could be influenced by their perception that “life
is good” thanks to climate change. Their behaviors with potential climate impacts, such as energy use and product consumptions choices, could also be shaped by their climate change
winner profiles. Thus, whereas legal scholars have extensively
explored how to protect climate change losers, this Article is the
ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/
climate-impacts-report.pdf.
3. See, e.g., IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 69 (“For increases
in global average temperature of less than 1 to 3°C above 1980–1999 levels,
some impacts are projected to produce market benefits in some places and sectors while, at the same time, imposing costs in other places and sectors.”); U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL
WARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE: BACK TO BASICS, 6–7 (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/Climate_Basics
.pdf (acknowledging “a warming climate will have both positive and negative
impacts” and mentioning benefits to some crops, improved water availability,
lower heating bills, and outdoor recreation as examples); U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30 (increased precipitation), 65
(decreased severe cold), 88 (recreational benefits of warmer weather), 139
(longer frost-free periods), 140 (longer growing seasons). See generally infra
Part I.
4. See FRANCES G. SUSSMAN & J. RANDALL FREED, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A BUSINESS APPROACH 2–
4 (2008) (discussing various business opportunities resulting from climate
change).
5. See DALE W. JORGENSON ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, U.S. MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, at v
(2004) (“Once temperature and other key climate parameters reach certain
thresholds . . . benefits peak and begin to decline—eventually becoming damages.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 99
(“[W]hile there are likely to be some benefits and opportunities in the early
stages of warming, as climate continues to change, negative impacts are projected to dominate.”).
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first in legal scholarship to ask what to do about the prospect of
many people and businesses believing they are climate change
winners.
Talk of climate change benefits goes against the grain of
prevailing climate policy dialogue. It is not for polite “green”
conversation. It certainly has not been the subject of legal
scholarship. True, some economists, not uncontroversially, have
6
developed integrated assessment model (IAM) projections
showing the United States faring relatively well under plausible climate change scenarios compared to other nations and,
from this, have argued that this national “winner” outcome militates against pursuing aggressive domestic greenhouse gas
7
emission regulation policies. In more focused econometric research, a number of detailed studies have also suggested the
8
potential for gains in the agriculture sector. But most scientific
and policy analyses of climate change impacts, especially official ones, pay little attention to the climate change impacts
6. IAM is “insider lingo for a multiple-equation computer-simulated
model that combines dynamic economics with geophysical climate dynamics
for the purposes of analyzing the economic effects of global climate change. An
IAM is essentially a model of economic growth with a controllable externality
of endogenous greenhouse warming.” Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of the
Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE
703, 705 (2007) [hereinafter Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review]. See
generally Hadi Dowlatabadi, Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change:
An Incomplete Overview, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 289 (1995) (providing a broad overview of IAM methods and policy uses); William D. Nordhaus, Integrated Economic and Climate Modeling (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1839,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970295 (surveying current IAM
techniques).
7. Compare Robert O. Mendelsohn, A Critique of the Stern Report, REGULATION, Winter 2006–2007, at 42, 42 (“[E]conomists have long argued that
stabilizing greenhouse gases at 550 ppm is not efficient because the costs far
outweigh the benefits.”), with Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate
Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (2009) (describing and
challenging this position). The economist William Nordhaus started this debate with his classic paper on “going slow” with greenhouse gas regulation. See
William D. Nordhaus, To Slow or Not to Slow: The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, 101 ECON. J. 920 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Oliver Deschênes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change: Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random
Fluctuations in Weather, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 354 (2007); Günther Fischer et
al., Socio-Economic and Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture: An Integrated Assessment, 1990–2080, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 2067,
2074 (2005); Cynthia Rosenzwelg & Martin L. Parry, Potential Impact of Climate Change on World Food Supply, 367 NATURE 133, 133 (1994) (noting that
crop declines are only small to moderate); I. Supit et al., Recent Changes in the
Climatic Yield Potential of Various Crops in Europe, 103 AGRIC. SYS. 683, 688
(2010).
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that will produce market and nonmarket benefits, begrudgingly
acknowledging them in the most general of terms and then in9
variably qualifying with discussion of adverse impacts. In particular, within-country distributions of costs and benefits of
10
climate change are poorly understood, the benefits side of the
11
ledger has been only superficially studied, and how to take
12
advantage of any benefits is virtually never discussed. Conse9. See, e.g., CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE ORDER S-13-2008, at 94 (2009), avail-

able
at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2009publications/CNRA-1000-2009-027/
CNRA-1000-2009-027-F.PDF (“[T]he production of high-quality wine grapes is
expected to benefit from a warmer climate because of a longer growing season
and more favorable growing conditions in the short-term. At some point, however, the magnitude of the warming may become too large for certain grape
varieties.”); IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (“Overall it is expected that benefits will be outweighed by the negative health effects of rising
temperatures.”), 49 (“The negative impacts of climate change on freshwater
systems outweigh its benefits . . . impacts of increased annual runoff in some
areas are likely to be tempered by negative effects of increased precipitation
variability and seasonal runoff shifts on water supply, water quality and flood
risk.”); THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL.
AFFAIRS, MASSACHUSETTS CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION REPORT 15 (2011),
available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/cca/eea-climate-adaptationreport.pdf (“While a longer growing season due to increased temperatures may
support new crops and fruits, agricultural activities could experience compounded impacts due to changes in precipitation and runoff, and increasing
weed and pest problems.”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra
note 2, at 12 (“Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide
and low levels of warming, but higher levels of warming often negatively affect
growth and yields.”), 30 (“[P]otential water resource benefits from increasing
precipitation could be countered by the competing influences of increasing
evaporation and runoff.”).
10. See Robert Mendelsohn et al., The Distributional Impact of Climate
Change on Rich and Poor Countries, 11 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 159, 174 (2006)
(conducting a broad study of relative effects at national scales, but acknowledging that “many countries are large enough so that different regions will
have different effects within national borders”).
11. See Jason Scott Johnston, A Looming Policy Disaster, REGULATION,
Fall 2008, at 38, 39 (complaining that official impact assessments are “not at
all keen on identifying benefits from global warming”). Economist Robert
Mendelsohn claims that “as economic research on impacts has improved, the
magnitude of projected damages from climate change has fallen,” one reason
being “that the early studies . . . did not always take into account some of the
benefits of warming to agriculture, timber, and tourism.” Robert Mendelsohn,
Climate Change and Economic Growth 10–11 (Comm’n on Growth & Dev.,
Working Paper No. 60, 2009), available at http://environment.yale.edu/files/
biblio/YaleFES-00000397.pdf.
12. For example, a recent federal government report on climate change
adaptation policy fails to mention that there will be any benefits from climate
change, and thus necessarily fails to discuss how adaptation policy could help
harness them. INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE,
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quently, although most analysts agree some areas of the world
13
will be hit harder than others, the probability that millions of
people and thousands of businesses and communities within
particular nations such as the United States will actually receive significant market and nonmarket benefits from climate
change is rarely mentioned in official statements as something
14
climate policy should take into account.
FEDERAL ACTIONS FOR A CLIMATE RESILIENT NATION 2 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/2011_adaptation_
progress_report.pdf. Similarly, state and local adaptation analyses and plans
developed to date are devoid of any discussion of benefit-securing adaptation
measures. See, e.g., CAL. NATURAL RES. AGENCY, supra note 9, passim;
CHICAGO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2011), available at http://www
.chicagoclimateaction.org/filebin/pdf/finalreport/CCAPREPORTFINALv2.pdf;
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS,
supra note 9, passim; MD. COMM’N ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE ACTION
PLAN (2008), available at http://www.mdclimatechange.us/ewebeditpro/items/
O40F14798.pdf; WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, PREPARING FOR CHANGING
CLIMATE: WASHINGTON STATE’S INTEGRATED CLIMATE RESPONSE STRATEGY
(2012), available at www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/ipa_responsestrategy.htm.
A recent business adaptation strategy report by the Pew Center on Global
Climate Change mentions several opportunities climate change presents for
businesses but does not discuss any of these in the larger discussion of business adaptation strategies. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 2–4, 7–10.
One exception to this pattern comes from Scotland, where the national adaptation strategy includes ample references to climate change benefits the nation
might enjoy and includes them, albeit with little detail, within the scope of the
adaptation strategy. See THE SCOTTISH GOV’T, SCOTLAND’S CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION FRAMEWORK 9 (2009), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Resource/Doc/295110/0091310.pdf (discussing benefits like increased outdoor
recreation opportunities and fewer deaths because of cold). I have been unable
to locate any public, private, or nonprofit-sector analyses of how to design and
implement adaptation strategies for securing climate change benefits in the
United States.
13. A number of the national scale IAM studies show North America,
Russia, and Eastern Europe as best off under a range of climate change scenarios, with small to substantial increases in GDP, and Africa, parts of Asia,
and small island states as worst off. See RICHARD S.J. TOL, AN ANALYSIS OF
MITIGATION AS A RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 6, 10 (2009) (chart based on
synthesis of a dozen IAM studies); Asbjørn Aaheim et al., Impacts and Adaptation to Climate Change in European Economies, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE
959, 964–67 (2012) (concluding that Eastern European nations will see a rise
in GDP under a scenario of a global mean temperature rise of 2°C); Robert
Mendelsohn et al., Country-Specific Market Impacts of Climate Change, 45
CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 561–65 (2000) (“Given these regional results, it is no
surprise that the impacts of global warming are not felt uniformly across
countries.”).
14. See Karen L. O’Brien & Robin M. Leichenko, Winners and Losers in
the Context of Global Change, 93 ANNALS OF ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 89, 89
(2003) [hereinafter O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers] (“In the case of
global climate change, policy-makers are often reluctant to identify or
acknowledge winners and losers, particularly winners. Many consider such
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Indeed, only a handful of legal scholars weighing in on U.S.
15
policy for climate change mitigation (avoiding climate change)
16
and adaptation (coping with climate change) so much as mention that there will be climate change benefits of any kind or
magnitude. Most of those who have examined the topic confine
the analysis to whether the United States will be an overall
winner among nations and, if so, what that means for our do17
mestic and international policies. Few legal scholars even allude to the possibility that significant streams of climate
change benefits in different regions and industries of the Unit18
ed States could complicate domestic politics.
discussions to be divisive and detrimental to efforts to develop a global accord
on climate change abatement.”); see also id. at 97 (“[E]xplicit references to
winners and losers is largely avoided in official documents.”). There is anecdotal evidence that talk of climate change winners was not merely officially suppressed early in the international climate policy dialogue, but was punished. A
researcher who obtained international and domestic agency funding for a 1990
workshop on national climate change winners and losers claims that one funding agent was subsequently reprimanded and the other fired. M. Glantz, Oh!
What a Lovely Climate Change: Global Warming’s Winners and Losers,
FRAGILECOLOGIES (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.fragilecologies.com/?p=692.html.
15. Climate change “mitigation” refers to “measures to reduce climate
change by, for example, reducing emissions of heat-trapping gases and particles, or increasing removal of heat-trapping gases from the atmosphere.” U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 8.
16. Climate change “adaptation” refers to “measures to improve our ability to cope with or avoid harmful impacts and take advantage of beneficial
ones, now and in the future.” Id. at 11.
17. See Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?,
23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 4 –37 (2007) (examining theories of which nations should finance adaptation efforts in hard-hit poor countries and rejecting
the “winners pay” approach); Freeman & Guzman, supra note 7 (challenging
the argument that the United States is a climate change winner); Symposium,
Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10695 (2011) (featuring
a series of responses by economists and environmental law and policy experts
to Freeman and Guzman’s Climate Change and U.S. Interests); Cass R.
Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1675, 1677 (2008) (discussing the national scale costs and benefits as guiding
domestic policy); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 697–99 (1999) (observing that climate change impacts will vary across nations and thus complicate
international solutions); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22–42 (2008)
(arguing that the national aggregate of local benefits from climate change undercuts the case that Congress intended the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
18. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 38–39, 41 (arguing that “the moderating effect of global warming on wintertime temperatures in the cold northern,
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But there will be climate change beneficiaries living among
19
us at every geopolitical scale. Regardless of whether the United States in the aggregate will be a climate change winner
compared to any other nation, there will be climate change
benefits flowing to some people and some businesses within
every region, state, county, city, and neighborhood in our nation. The major construction business building seawalls where
20
coastal properties face sea level rise, the farmer enjoying
21
longer growing seasons within sight of mountains with dying
22
ski areas, and the impoverished family with lower heating
23
bills living in the same community as other people faced with
24
increased flooding —they and many people and businesses like
them will all be receiving climate change benefits near people
and businesses suffering climate change harms. And if enough
climate change beneficiaries are concentrated in any particular
region, they may very well influence local and even state politi25
cal units to take their constituents’ benefits into account. In
short, people and businesses are likely to begin to attach iminterior, and northeastern regions of the United States will be a decided benefit to people living in such places, worth billions of dollars a year” and predicting that this uneven projected geographic distribution of costs and benefits of
climate change will complicate achieving agreement on national policy); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1185 (2009) (“The
potential for short-term benefits from climate change in nations like the United States will fuel other climate change lawmaking skeptics.”). I have briefly
raised domestic climate change benefits as a policy issue in several previously
published articles but have not developed the topic as I set out to do in this
Article. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 383–84 (2010).
19. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 50.
20. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that climate change
might increase the market for “climate proofing materials”).
21. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 2074.
22. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that winter tourism
will decline due to climate change).
23. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7.
24. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 41.
25. It has been shown, for example, that legislators from jurisdictions
with high greenhouse gas emissions tend to vote against climate change mitigation initiatives that could impose costs on the emission sources. See Michael
I. Cragg & Matthew E. Kahn, Carbon Geography: The Political Economy of
Congressional Support for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas
Production (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,963, 2009),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14963.pdf. There is every reason to
believe that legislators in jurisdictions receiving substantial climate change
benefits will be similarly likely to base their climate policy positions on the interests of their constituents.
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portance to their climate change benefits, enough to lead them
26
to behave like climate change winners in the political arena.
One need only consider as an example how successful the agriculture industry has been at challenging and avoiding envi27
ronmental regulation to see how the emergence of a class of
climate change winners could similarly warp climate policy.
This Article explores what policy steps to take now in anticipation of the growth in the United States of a substantial
and diverse class of people and businesses believing they are
climate change winners. My central argument is that climate
change winners are, on average, likely to place low priority on
mitigation policy aimed at regulating greenhouse gas emissions, or perhaps even oppose such policy, and high priority on
adaptation policies that will secure their climate change benefits. Indeed, lest there be any doubt about this potential, there
is evidence from the popular press that some people and businesses already are aware of their potential winner status and
are enjoying thinking about the possibilities. As one prominent
commentator has summed up:
It may sound odd to ask of global warming, What’s in it for me? But
the question is neither crass nor tongue-in-cheek. The ways in which
climate change could skew the world’s distribution of wealth should
help us appreciate just how profoundly an artificial greenhouse effect
might shake our lives. Moreover, some of the lasting effects of climate
change are likely to come not so much from the warming itself but
from how we react to it: If the world warms appreciably, men and
women will not sit by idly, eating bonbons and reading weather reports; there will be instead what economists call “adaptive response,”
most likely a great deal of it. Some aspects of this response may inflame tensions between those who are winning and those who are losing. How people, the global economy, and the international power
structure adapt to climate change may influence how we live for generations. If the world warms, who will win? Who will lose? And what’s
28
in it for you?

26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263 (2000) (reviewing the numerous and
substantial safe harbors agriculture has secured from environmental regulation).
28. Gregg Easterbrook, Global Warming: Who Loses—and Who Wins?,
THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2007, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2007/04/global-warming-who-loses-and-who-wins/305698
(discussing broadly the climate change winner issue); see also Olaf Stampf,
Global Warming: Not the End of the World as We Know It, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INT’L (Christopher Sultan trans., May 7, 2007), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/global-warming-not-the-end-of-the-world-as-we-knowit-a-481684.html (discussing likely climate change winners in Germany).
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Some respected policy analysis organizations also are beginning to pay attention to opportunities in climate change.
Particularly telling is a passage from a recent study of business
and climate change observing that
for many businesses, at least some of the physical changes associated
with climate change may present opportunities as well as risks . . . .
Adaptation may also create new product markets, such as climate
proofing materials and building designs, or result in market shifts, by
making locally sourced materials more attractive in order to reduce
travel miles, for instance.
Similar examples can be constructed for many other businesses,
suggesting that climate change will produce both winners and losers,
29
risks and opportunities.

Going even further, the State of Oregon has observed that
government economic development policy could take advantage
of potential opportunities from climate change, in that
[r]esponding to climate change will cause large amounts of capital to
flow into both low-carbon technology and adaptation technology. Oregon should view this transition as an economic development opportunity. By choosing to act now, Oregon can create a business environment that stimulates and supports both mitigation and adaptation
technologies. As early adopters, Oregon businesses can earn critical
early market share. This can drive economic growth in the state and
will establish a foundation for exporting both products and expertise
30
to other states and the rest of the world.

The message is clear—many people and businesses in the
United States are going to see a bright side to climate change,
and some of them are already thinking about it. It seems unlikely that these and other climate change winners will be leading the way for aggressive greenhouse gas emissions regula31
tion. Moreover, even if they generally support or are
indifferent about regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, they
are likely to be interested in how to direct public policy to reap
their climate change benefits while available. Clearly, therefore, the time to consider how climate change winners factor in29. See, e.g., SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3.
30. GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., FINAL REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR: A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING RAPID CLIMATE CHANGE 10
(2008), available at http://cms.oregon.gov/ENERGY/gblwrm/docs/ccigreport08web
.pdf. Although it is unique among domestic government climate change adaptation policy documents in recognizing these climate change benefits, like other official reports the Oregon study does not delve into details about the scope
of economic opportunities or how to take advantage of them.
31. Cf. J.P. Palutikof et al., Public Perceptions of Unusually Warm Weather in the UK: Impacts, Responses and Adaptations, 26 CLIMATE RES. 43, 58
(2004) (concluding that people will be unlikely to take steps to mitigate climate change when they view climate change as personally beneficial).
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to the climate policy debate is now. That is the objective of this
Article.
Part I of the Article opens by framing the premises and
limitations of the analysis and by developing a typology of climate change benefits and beneficiaries. Given the inevitable
emergence and broad distribution of climate change benefits
and beneficiaries, Part II of the Article uses a framework social
scientists have developed for thinking about winners and losers
in global change processes generally to define climate change
winners as people and businesses who, accurately or not, perceive that their lives and enterprises are better off because of
the benefits they are receiving or anticipate receiving from climate change. Part II also explores evidence suggesting that
people and businesses are likely to know when they receive
climate change benefits and to self-identify themselves as climate change winners if the benefits are substantial. Part III
then frames the interests of climate change winners more concretely in the political economy of climate policy, making the
case that because people and businesses seeing themselves as
climate change winners might be sufficiently concentrated to
exert political influence on local and regional scales, they may
succeed in influencing the mitigation and adaptation policies of
many local political units, thus complicating state and national
political discourse on climate change.
Using the background developed in Parts I through III, the
remainder of the Article turns to normative dimensions and
positive legal responses. Part IV argues that climate change
mitigation policy should not be influenced by the prospect of a
large class of climate change winners, arguing that climate
change policy should focus principally on cost-effective
measures to stabilize the climate without regard to the impact
doing so could have on the sub-national distribution of climate
change benefits. By contrast, Part V argues that climate
change adaptation policy, in addition to its focus on increasing
the resilience and reducing the vulnerability of populations
threatened by climate change, should also make efficient investments to harness climate change benefits on behalf of climate change winners.
There is nothing inconsistent about working to limit climate change with one hand while working with the other hand
to secure and deliver the benefits of climate change to those for-
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32

tunate enough to be able to enjoy them. I argue in Part VI,
however, that given the national policy goal of mitigating and
adapting to climate change, no vested rights in climate change
benefits should accrue. The two-pronged policy outlined in
Parts IV and V must be put into place now in order to incorporate and acculturate a “no vested rights” condition of climate
change benefits. Part VI thus outlines legal doctrines and techniques that can be employed to support this condition.
Rather than treating it as taboo, the topic of climate
change winners should be fully aired in climate policy dialogue.
Climate change policy has triggered complex and difficult
tradeoff decisions, even with relatively little thus far in the way
33
of climate change impacts. These tradeoffs can only become
more complex and contested as tangible climate change harms
and benefits begin to take hold across the landscape and
34
throughout the economy. Climate change benefits, and those
who believe they are climate change winners, are in our not35
too-distant future. By the time they do emerge, climate policy
needs to have already settled what to do about them. The approach I advocate in this Article is designed to build a climate
change winners component into the front end of climate policy
development, so that the benefits of climate change can be
reaped through adaptation policies without derailing the mitigation policies designed to eliminate them.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS AND
BENEFICIARIES
Although the dimensions and demographics of the climate
change winners problem cannot be predicted with any more
36
certainty than can other impacts of climate change, there is
no scenario of climate change in play in official policy dialogue
that can reasonably be interpreted to rule out the possibility of
substantial market and nonmarket benefits from climate
change for people and businesses in many areas. There is simp32. See, e.g., GOVERNOR’S CLIMATE CHANGE INTEGRATION GRP., supra
note 30, at 10 (recommending both mitigating the effects of climate change
and preparing for economic opportunities from climate change).
33. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 12
(listing early impacts of climate change and noting that impacts “are expected
to increase”).
34. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3.
35. See id.
36. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that the positive effects have not
been quantified).
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ly no plausible way to project warming in the climate system
and not concede there will be many people and businesses benefitting directly and indirectly from the changes taking place at
the ground level. This part of the Article first demonstrates
that this reality of direct and indirect streams of climate
change benefits is inescapable, and then develops a typology of
the different ways in which people and businesses will receive
these benefits.
There are several premises I assume to be true to put these
arguments in motion. First, I assume that people and businesses are able, even if in very rough form, to connect climate
change to changes in their economic circumstances. Second, I
assume they act primarily out of self-interest. Third, I assume
that their planning horizons do not extend in any manner
meaningful to my purposes beyond one or two generations for
people, and a decade or two at most for businesses and communities. Fourth, I assume that climate change integrated as37
sessment models (IAMs) cannot accurately predict local flows
of climate change benefits and harms beyond those planning
horizons, at best. Fifth, I assume that mitigation techniques
(e.g., emissions regulation) and technology (e.g., carbon sequestration) cannot deliver climate stabilization benefits within
those planning horizons, and likely not until much later. Sixth,
I assume that climate change IAMs cannot accurately predict
when a particular mitigation policy’s package of techniques and
technologies will stabilize climate or what the new climate regime will be.
I concede that any of these premises is subject to debate:
people may have limited capacity to understand how climate
change affects them; some people care deeply about and act on
behalf of people in other countries and ecosystems around the
globe suffering from climate change; some people care deeply
about and act on behalf of the environment and people of the
very deep future; the predictive capacity of climate models
could improve dramatically beyond present capacities; and
some new technology might appear that allows far more rapid
and precise manipulation of climate than we currently believe
38
possible. Nevertheless, my premises seem reasonably secure
37. See supra note 6.
38. If people cannot perceive the risks of climate change, support for mitigation would likely fall. See Sammy Zahran et al., Climate Change Vulnerability and Policy Support, 19 SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES: AN INT’L J. 771, 781
(2006) (showing that individuals who perceive climate change as harmful to
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given what we know about psychology, personal and business
planning, the climate system, climate modeling capacity, and
technology; otherwise we would not have much of a climate
change policy problem in the first place. I do not discuss these
premises further except where necessary to the analysis that
follows below. Rather, my focus is on establishing that there
will be people and businesses that believe they are climate
change winners, and then on exploring what policy implications
they present given how they might behave under these assumptions.
If I am right about the emergence of climate change winners, they are likely soon to become a force in the climate policy
dialogue as their enjoyment of substantial climate change benefits alters not only the dispassionate cost-benefit analysis of
mitigation and adaption measures, but also the political economy of climate policy. I write from the perspective that these
influences will be of most concern to policymakers interested in
pursuing effective mitigation policy and robust investment in
harm-reducing adaptation measures to advance our nation’s
climate agenda, and therefore I adopt that position as the reference point for examining how the emergence of a substantial
class of climate change winners will influence that policy package’s success.
Given this reference point, it is appropriate for me to make
some disclosures and representations about my scope and purpose. First, I do not purport to build econometric models of climate change at any scale—national, local, or individual—or to
weigh in on the heated debates regarding the design and interpretation of the expanding universe of IAM studies. Nevertheless, one unequivocal goal of the Article is to add reason to believe that mitigation policy should not rely on IAMs as much as
it has, especially when taking climate change benefits into account. Second, I do not explore the psychology of how people
form perceptions of what is harmful or beneficial to them generally. My inquiry picks up with the point at which they have
formed such impressions about the market and nonmarket impacts of climate change. However, from there I do explore the
available psychological literature on whether and how people
their personal welfare are significantly more likely to support climate change
mitigation and adaptation policies). On the other hand, people with an integrated concern for intergenerational equity, carrying capacity, and resource
scarcity, and who regard the biosphere as deserving of moral consideration,
have been shown to be more willing to assume the costs of climate change prevention. See id.
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will associate those personal effects with climate change and
how they will act on those associations. Third, I attach no normative moral significance to the idea that people may conclude
they are climate change winners. For my purposes they are
simply people who believe climate change has been or will be
good to them. The question of whether holding such a belief is
39
immoral is outside the scope of my inquiry; however, what
they do about their beliefs in the political sphere raises normative questions I do explore. Fourth, my focus on climate change
winners in the United States is not intended to trivialize the
likelihood that people and businesses in the United States and
many other nations will be overwhelmingly on the losing side of
40
climate change. Given the likelihood of many winners in the
United States, however, and given how important U.S. policy is
to overall global action on climate change, it is useful to isolate
the winners phenomenon in our nation to consider its domestic
political impact. Finally, nothing about my description of climate change benefits and winners is intended to support the
case for climate change skepticism or opposition to mitigation
41
and adaptation policies. In fact, my purpose is just the opposite. It is necessary, however, to describe the benefits and their
beneficiaries in order to discuss the political implications and
appropriate policy and legal responses.

39. It would be difficult to make the case that any descriptive morals
against recognition of climate change benefits or beneficiaries have formed in
the United States given the significant numbers of people who continue to be
skeptical of climate change in general or, even if they believe it is happening,
oppose more aggressive regulatory responses. Most Americans perceive of climate change as a low to medium political priority, and almost half of Americans believe their local, state, and federal governments are devoting sufficient
attention to climate change or should be doing even less. See ANTHONY
LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN MAY
2011, at 2–4 (2011) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MAY 2011]
(producing results from a May 2011 survey of over 1000 interviews); ANTHONY
LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE
MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN MIND: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY POLICIES IN
MARCH 2012, at 2 (2012) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH
2012] (producing results from a March 2012 survey of over 1000 interviews).
40. See generally IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2 (describing generally the harms of climate change).
41. See LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH 2012, supra note 39, at 2.

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS

221

A. BENEFITS
For purposes of the policy analysis following later in the
Article, it is useful to divide climate change benefits into those
that are direct consequences of the biophysical changes brought
42
by climate change—such as longer growing seasons —and
benefits that flow indirectly from those biophysical changes—
such as the coffee shop experiencing increased business in an
agricultural district enjoying longer growing seasons, or a business selling adaptation products or services. The distinction is
important to policy given how different the climate change
winners associated with each are likely to be distributed and to
perceive their benefits.
1. Direct Benefits
Most of the direct benefits of climate change are associated
43
with the initial warming of temperature regimes. Higher
temperatures are, of course, the root of the climate change
problem for most climate change losers, but consider that there
are areas today which, for one reason or another, are held back
in some way because they are cold, sometimes severely so.
Hence, warming in such regions could produce benefits such as
44
longer growing seasons for agriculture, reduced strain on
45
transportation infrastructure from freezing, longer outdoor
46
recreation and tourism seasons, reduced health hazards of se42. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 2074.
43. See, e.g., TOL, supra note 13, at 30 (mentioning increased Arctic harbor access from melted ice as a benefit of climate warming).
44. See Fisher et al., supra note 8, at 2074 (“[L]arge gains are predicted
for North America . . . due to longer planting windows and generally more favourable growing conditions under warming.”). See generally Johnston, supra
note 17, at 33–36 (summarizing agriculture studies).
45. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (mentioning reduced traffic disruptions
due to snow and ice); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2,
at 61 (“Decreased extreme cold will provide some benefits such as reduced
snow and ice removal costs.”).
46. See Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 10 (“[S]ummer recreation is substantially larger than winter recreation and would increase with warming.”);
SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (“Tourism will also face a mixed picture,
with opportunities for winter tourism and some ecosystem uses declining, but
being replaced in some cases by extended spring and summer recreation opportunities.”); TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (observing that tourism economies are
likely to shift as a result of warming); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 88 (“The length of the season for, and desirability of,
several of the most popular activities—walking; visiting a beach, lakeshore, or
river; sightseeing; swimming; and picnicking—are likely to be enhanced by
small near-term increases in temperature.”).
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47

vere cold, fewer work stoppages due to cold weather condi48
49
tions, lower winter heating bills, and better ocean transportation and resource extraction options in previously frozen re50
gions. Many people also simply enjoy mild climates and are
51
willing to pay for them.
Warming will also drive changes in precipitation patterns,
in some areas to the benefit of some water users by increasing
52
water availability. More water, of course, can be a good or a
bad thing, but the point is that it can be a good thing for many
53
people. Increased water supplies could, for example, benefit
agricultural land uses, reduce regional supply scarcity prob54
lems, and enhance hydropower production capacity.
It is more difficult to predict with any detail the direct benefits from other biophysical impacts of climate change. Indeed,
here I have to speculate as there is such a paucity of robust
studies of climate change benefits. Rising sea levels, for example, will certainly have adverse effects on many existing coastal
land uses. But it is not merely facetious to observe that some
47. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (“Climate change is
projected to bring some benefits in temperate areas, such as fewer deaths from
cold exposure . . . .”). See generally Johnston, supra note 17, at 26–29 (summarizing health effect studies).
48. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 3 (offering the example of a
roofing company able to extend its work season).
49. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“Warmer temperatures may result in higher energy bills for air conditioning in summer, and
lower bills for heating in winter.”).
50. See Joshua Ho, The Implications of Arctic Sea Ice Decline on Shipping,
34 MARINE POL’Y 713, 714 (2010) (predicting that “tremendous shipping benefits would accrue” given that Arctic routes “would trim about 5000 nautical
miles and a week’s sailing time” compared to routes using the Suez Canal);
TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (mentioning improved harbor access, resource exploitation, and transport routes in the Arctic).
51. See Johnston, supra note 17, at 21–26 (summarizing studies showing
mild climate as an amenity value).
52. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30
(noting that northern areas of the United States will become wetter).
53. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing “[t]he
beneficial impacts of increased annual runoff in some areas”); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“An overall increase in precipitation may
increase water availability in some regions, but also create greater flood potential.”).
54. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC
SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE
MITIGATION: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12 (2012), available at http://srren
.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Full_Report.pdf (“For hydropower the overall impacts on the global technical potential is expected to be slightly
positive.”).
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land areas will benefit from becoming closer to the coast,
though exactly where, in what ways, and by how much are
55
hard to say. Even more difficult to project are the benefits
some people may derive from shifts in ecological regimes. Some
species will migrate from one area to another to follow chang56
ing temperature and precipitation regimes. If a species exiting
a region was considered undesirable by some people in the area, or if a species moving into a new area is considered desirable by some people in the area, they have potential climate
change benefits. Indeed, some species will stay where they are
57
but actually prosper from climate change, and if people in the
area find the species desirable for whatever reason, there are
potential climate change benefits. My point is that even the
climate change impacts portrayed in climate policy dialogue as
the sources of the worst of climate change—sea level rise and
ecological shifting—will nonetheless produce some direct benefits for some people in some places.
These and other direct benefits would, obviously, be concentrated around the areas where the relevant biophysical
changes are occurring, though some benefits, such as more water, could be transported considerable distances. This is not to
say that all people in such areas will be beneficiaries, or that
the biophysical changes always will produce some benefits. Agriculture, for example, presents a complex set of conditions defining where and when benefits of warming and precipitation
can be secured, as temperature, carbon dioxide levels, precipitation patterns, weeds, pests, and crop type all factor into the
58
profile for any location. Overall, however, we can expect direct
55. See Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 10–12 (discussing the economic dynamics of coastal transitions and noting that high-value coastal areas are likely to be protected through adaptation measures such as sea walls).
56. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 7 (“The range and
distribution of many species will change.”). There is evidence such adaptive
responses already are occurring. See David Nogués-Bravo & Carsten Rahbek,
Communities Under Climate Change, 334 SCIENCE 1070 (2011) (advocating for
new large-scale and interdisciplinary research approaches to measure species
movement and adaptation due to climate change).
57. See Nogués-Bravo & Rahbek, supra note 56, at 1070 (“Other species
will cope with climate change in situ or perish.”).
58. See Supit et al., supra note 8, at 693 (explaining the various factors in
connection with research showing that the benefits of increased carbon dioxide
levels may reduce the adverse effects of increasing temperatures for some
crops in some areas); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the interaction of warming, carbon dioxide, water, and nutrients); see also
Wolfram Schlenker et al., Will U.S. Agriculture Really Benefit from Global
Warming? Accounting for Irrigation in the Hedonic Approach, 95 AM. ECON.
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climate change benefits to concentrate in some magnitude in
some areas where temperatures rise, precipitation increases,
and other biophysical climate change effects take hold in ways
offering economic benefits directly to people and businesses in
geographic proximity to the physical impacts.
Generally speaking, temperature-driven direct benefits
will favor areas in northern latitudes and higher altitudes—i.e.,
the areas currently more likely to be suffering the downsides of
59
being cold. The areas benefitting from increased precipitation
are not as easily generalized given how sensitive local water
60
balances can be to climate, though most models have identified the Northeastern United States as receiving more precipi61
tation and the Southwest receiving less. Rising sea levels will
affect all coastal areas, and shifting ecosystems are likely to affect the entire nation, making it extremely difficult to predict
beyond the fact that there will be some benefits in some places
as a result of these and similarly ubiquitous changes.
2. Indirect Benefits
Whereas the most significant sources of direct climate
change benefits—increased temperature and precipitation—are
likely to produce patchy geographies with areas of concentrated
benefits and harms, indirect climate change benefits are more
likely to produce opportunities everywhere. This is because
there will be indirect benefits flowing from both the direct benefits and the direct harms of climate change. Far more than is
the case for direct benefits, therefore, the indirect benefits of
climate change follow no predictable geographic patterns—they
can arise virtually anywhere, anytime, for anyone. No area of
the nation, no neighborhood in the nation, will be without the
REV. 395 (2005) (arguing that costs of irrigation in drying areas must be taken
into account). The result is a complex geography of winner and loser agricultural districts. It is expected, for example, that agriculture in California and
North Carolina will, on balance, be substantial losers whereas Georgia and
Arizona will be substantial winners. See Deschênes & Greenstone, supra note
8, at 357 (summary), 378 (chart of state outcomes).
59. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 38–39, 41.
60. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 30
(explaining the difficulty of predicting local precipitation impacts); Mendelsohn et al., supra note 10, at 165 (noting that “[w]ater supply and demand in
specific regions can change dramatically across climate scenarios”).
61. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 47 (map of world projected precipitation pattern changes), 49 (map of world projected relative
changes in runoff ); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2,
at 31 (map of North America projected precipitation pattern changes).
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availability of some indirect benefits from climate change at
some point over the next one hundred years in one or more of
the following forms.
a. Direct Benefit Spillovers
Areas receiving substantial direct benefits of climate
change are an obvious case for indirect benefits in the form of
positive spillovers. The farmer that benefits directly from a
longer growing season purchases more fertilizer and gasoline,
spends more at local restaurants, and so on. The farmer’s increased prosperity generates benefits for others who in turn
continue rippling benefits through the economy. The growing
prosperity of the area in general may attract additional immigrants and investments, thus fueling the local concentration of
benefits and beneficiaries. An influx of immigrants could improve real estate markets and other sectors of a local economy.
Even some of the refugees from hard hit areas may find their
situations improved substantially above what their lives were
like back home prior to climate change. An entire local economy
might begin to thrive as indirect spillover benefits piggyback
direct benefits.
b. Adaptation Products and Services
Indirect benefits of climate change will not be limited to
areas with large sources of direct benefits. Areas feeling more
climate change harms than benefits, even lopsidedly so, will
need to invest in public infrastructure adaptation measures
such as seawalls, health services, and reconstruction of struc62
tures damaged by storm surges and floods. People living in
such areas will need climate proofing for homes, air conditioning, insurance products, and so on. The demand for these public
and private adaptive products and services may lead to technological advances, such as new insulation materials, new insurance products, and new crop strains, positioning businesses
63
selling the new products to profit substantially.
62. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 4 (offering the possibility of
the insurance industry “assisting homeowners and business in reducing losses
by taking appropriate adaptive action”).
63. See id. at 3–4 (offering the examples of new crop strains, new insurance products, new climate proofing materials, and new building designs); see,
e.g., OLIVER WYMAN FIN. SERVS., CLIMATE CHANGE: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES 1–6 (2007) (examining numerous upsides and means of “[c]apturing the opportunity” of climate change for financial service providers).
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Adaptation benefits will not be limited to areas where adaptation products and services are in demand. Whether a business thrives by selling its wares to people that are directly benefitted or directly harmed, and whether it sells them locally or
online, it benefits indirectly from climate change. A business
selling a new climate proofing material thus could operate from
anywhere, and an individual investor in that business could
live anywhere, as well.
c. Comparative Advantages
Climate change is likely to disrupt existing comparative
advantages in a variety of product and service industries, particularly agriculture, meaning some benefits will emerge in areas of the United States that enjoy newfound comparative
64
prowess. For example, even if conditions for a particular globally important crop decline in the United States, so long as they
are declining less drastically here than in other nations, our
65
growing regions for the crop may prosper. Even within the
United States, similar shifts in comparative advantages could
produce benefits in areas formerly not in comparative advantage to other regions. Some businesses will also profit from
climate change simply because they are better at managing for
its risks than other companies, thereby gaining competitive ad66
vantage. In general, climate change will spur global, regional,
national, and local economic transformations which, like any
large-scale economic change process, are likely to produce vast
67
numbers of winners and losers.

64. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 106
(“Climate change also has the potential to alter trade relationships by changing the comparative trade advantages of regions or nations.”).
65. See id.
66. See SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 4 (offering the examples of
businesses that avoid locking in high-value assets in high-risk areas well before other competitors); Jonathan Lash & Fred Wellington, Competitive Advantage on a Warming Planet, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2007, at 95, 96 (“[A]
company’s climate-related risk mitigation and product strategies can create
competitive advantage.”).
67. Cf., e.g., SANDRA POLASKI, WINNERS AND LOSERS: IMPACT OF THE
DOHA ROUND ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES passim (2006) (examining how
trade agreements might make “net winners and net losers” out of developing
nations); Nancy Birdsall & John Nellis, Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of Privatization, 31 WORLD DEV. 1617, 1622–25 (2003) (discussing the distributional effects of privatization in formerly state-dominated
economies); Elizabeth Brainerd, Winners and Losers in Russia’s Economic
Transition, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1094 passim (1998) (studying winners and los-
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d. Regulatory Benefits
New federal, state, and local climate change mitigation and
adaptation regulations necessarily will create opportunities for
people and businesses to take advantage of the new regulatory
programs for economic gain. This effect is well established by
examples such as wetlands mitigation banking, where regulatory programs require someone destroying a protected wetland
to compensate for the loss, and the method of choice is to purchase credits from someone else who has improved wetlands
68
elsewhere. Somewhat perversely, this wetland credits industry exists and prospers only because other industries fill wetlands and must comply with regulations, but it exists nonethe69
less. It seems only likely that climate change mitigation and
adaptation regulations fashioned around different regulatory
models will create similar opportunities for people and businesses to derive regulatory benefits. New regulatory programs
could also erect barriers to entry that may advantage existing
firms in an industry, as well as present opportunities for comparative advantage effects as some firms will be able to develop
more effective strategies for obtaining incentives and other
70
compliance benefits.
B. BENEFICIARIES
Just as there will be different kinds of climate change benefits, so too will there be different kinds of people and businesses taking advantage of them. A policy-relevant typology of potential beneficiaries includes at least the following somewhat
overlapping groups.
ers in terms of wage disparity in a large-scale economic transformation context).
68. For background information on wetland mitigation banking, see Royal
C. Gardner, Mitigation, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING
SECTION 404, at 253 (Kim Diana Connolly et al. eds., 2005); Palmer Hough &
Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act:
Where It Comes From, What It Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15
(2009).
69. See Hough & Robertson, supra note 68, at 24 (explaining that businesses “acquire these [wetland] credits to meet their compensatory mitigation
requirements”).
70. See Daniel L. Millimet et al., Environmental Regulations and Economic Activity: Influence on Market Structure, 2009 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON.
99, 100 (“Environmental regulation may affect market structure by modifying
. . . entry of new firms . . . and the relative competitive advantage of active
firms.”), 110 (“[R]egulation affects the incentive of firms to invest in technology adoption, innovation, and research and development . . . .”).
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1. Passive
Many will benefit from climate change without any
thought or change in behavior at all. The farmer enjoying a
longer growing season has done nothing other than add more
days to the routine of work and expenditures. A roofing company benefitting from longer outdoor construction seasons does
nothing but keep workers working. A family whose heating
bills fall because of fewer cold days has done nothing other than
keep the thermostat set at the same temperature they would
have anyway. A shipping line in high latitudes where the ice
season is short does nothing but keep shipping. The coffee shop
doing a brisker business in a newly prospering agricultural
town does nothing but pour more coffee. No calculated move is
needed for these and similarly situated people and businesses
to benefit directly or indirectly from climate change—rather,
they benefit passively.
Passive beneficiaries of climate change nevertheless are
likely to become acculturated to the new good times. Although
they have not actively sought their benefits, they no doubt will
invest in them, such as the farmer who purchases new equipment and the coffee shop that has expanded to meet new busi71
ness. Many passive beneficiaries of climate change, therefore,
may begin to behave as if they are invested in and entitled to
their climate change benefits when it comes to mitigation and
adaptation policies.
2. Adaptive
Unlike passive beneficiaries, who benefit simply by profitably doing more of what they were doing before climate change,
some people and businesses facing deteriorating conditions as a
result of climate change will respond by adapting in ways that
may ultimately prove highly beneficial. An example comes from
the West Coast’s wine production industry, where extensive
modeling suggests that by sticking with their current wine
grapes, growers in California and Washington face significant
losses of suitable production acres, but that “adaptation to the
warming, such as the introduction of heat-tolerant varieties of
71. See, e.g., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at
73 (noting that farmers adapting to climate change will have to adjust “a wide
range of farming practices,” including buying potentially expensive stresstolerant seeds and investing in new equipment); Ho, supra note 50, at 714 –15
(arguing that vessels seeking to take advantage of a Northern Sea Route created by global warming will need improved ship technology).
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grapes, could sharply reduce the losses in California and turn
72
the Washington loss into a 150% gain.” Washington may be
the next California of wines.
The point is that climate change could spur adaptations
that lead to economic outcomes for some people and businesses
superior to their previous conditions. A farmer who shifts to
high-value crops, a ski area that moves heavily into lucrative
warm weather recreation, a clothing store that stocks more
popular warm weather outfitting—these people and businesses
are not passively benefitting, but neither are they passively sit73
ting back and taking their climate change licks. Even more so
than passive beneficiaries, we can expect such adaptive beneficiaries, given their ingenuity and investment in the adaptive
response, to feel positive about and entitled to their benefits.
3. Opportunistic
Some people and businesses will actively work to seize direct and indirect benefit opportunities from climate change.
Longer growing seasons, for example, may prompt some people
to go into farming or farm supply businesses who otherwise
might not have. More opportunistically, a business might work
on developing new technologies to market to people harmed by
climate change to adapt, such as climate proof building materials, new forms of hot weather clothing, or improved seawall
74
building techniques. And most opportunistic of all, some people will benefit from climate change by making shrewd investment decisions about which businesses will be climate change
winners and losers.
72. Richard A. Kerr, Vital Details of Global Warming Are Eluding Forecasters, 334 SCIENCE 173, 174 (2011). Similarly, cranberry crop production is
expected to rise in Maine, and cranberry producers are seeking land there and
even farther north into Canada. North Cairn, Climate Change May Boost
State’s Cranberry Take, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Maine), Sept. 30, 2012,
available
at
http://www.pressherald.com/news/climate-change-may-boost
-states-cranberry-take_2012-09-30.html.
73. Outcomes for agriculture and livestock industries in particular are
sensitive to adaptive capacity, with efficient adaptations potentially yielding
benefits in many cases. See Joel B. Smith & Jeffrey K. Lazo, A Summary of
Climate Change Impact Assessments from the U.S. Country Studies Program,
50 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 9–18 (2001).
74. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 57 tbl.4.1 (identifying
what new technologies or investments might benefit various sectors, such as
revenues from new attractions potentially boosting tourism); see, e.g.,
SUSSMAN & FREED, supra note 4, at 30 (“[I]indoor recreation may substitute
more frequently for outdoor recreation in areas that become uncomfortably
hot.”).
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This category of climate change beneficiaries, therefore, is
defined by the calculated steps and changes in behavior they
take to derive benefits from climate change. In other words,
they set out to become climate change winners. Although savvy
investors may be indifferent to mitigation policy, expecting they
can find good positions under any changing scenario, many of
the people and businesses who succeed at this opportunistic
strategy are not likely to be receptive to aggressive mitigation
policies. Moreover, they are likely to seek private and public investment in infrastructure necessary to make their benefits
more secure.
4. Migratory
Some people will move because of climate change and will
benefit as a result. All such people are opportunistic and adaptive in the sense that the direct or indirect effects of climate
change motivated a change in their behavior, but some will appear more opportunistic than adaptive or passive. For example,
some people might move simply to avoid severe harms of cli75
mate change, having no particular plan to benefit from climate change in their new home region but incidentally benefitting directly and indirectly nonetheless. Another person might
lose his or her job in one area because that employment sector
is suffering a downturn as a result of climate change (for example, a ski center employee), and decide to move to an area with
a better employment outlook in some sectors because of climate
change (for example, a beach resort enjoying warmer temperatures). Yet more opportunistically, another person might move
from a perfectly fine position in order to take an even better position, such as manager of a seawall construction company.
The point of creating such a category of migratory beneficiaries is not, however, to focus on their passive, adaptive, or
opportunistic behavior, but to emphasize the potential distributional effects of climate change benefits. The migratory response may both disperse beneficiaries more widely and concentrate beneficiaries in some regions. Moreover, people and
businesses making the investment to move as a result of cli75. A number of legal scholars have identified climate-based migration as
a significant issue for international and national policy. See, e.g., Kara K.
Moberg, Note, Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2009)
(summarizing the commentary to suggest that current international and domestic laws are inadequate to protect an increasing population of climate migrants).
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mate change, regardless of how opportunistically, and who
come out benefitting as a result are likely to take that investment into account when asked by climate mitigation policy to
yield the benefits they and their successors will enjoy.
5. Subsistence
Many climate change beneficiaries, whether passive, adaptive, opportunistic, migratory, or some combination thereof, will
be net winners only in the sense that their lives are made a little less miserable than they would have been without climate
76
change. For example, a family in poverty living in an area of
extreme cold might see heating bills slowly falling, or might
have improved transportation options, or might find a little
longer work season in agricultural fields. A struggling coffee
shop in the area may also enjoy lower heating bills and perhaps
a few more customers.
I treat such climate change circumstances in a separate
“subsistence” category to emphasize that it is not only climate
change losers who present sympathetic policy cases. Moreover,
although only marginally ahead and perhaps not seeing themselves as winners in life generally, many people and businesses
in the subsistence category might value their climate change
benefits dearly and strongly wish to retain them. As they are
also likely to be concentrated in areas of rural or urban poverty,
they could organize into a substantial political force in some local and state jurisdictions.
II. WHO ARE THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS?
Thus far I have used the term “climate change winner” to
refer to people and businesses who conclude that “life is good”
because of climate change. Yet, although it is indisputable that
there will be climate change benefits available to many people
and businesses, that does not necessarily mean any of the beneficiaries will actually be climate change winners or, correctly or
not, believe they are. Before we can move from there being benefits and their beneficiaries to there being winners in any sense
meaningful to climate policy, it is necessary to step back and
explore the idea of climate change winners in more detail. In
76. For example, although global warming will very likely ameliorate traffic conditions by melting snow and ice, that “pale[s] in comparison to the big
unknowns: extreme climate scenarios, the very long term, biodiversity loss,
the possible effects of climate change on economic development and even political violence.” TOL, supra note 13, at 17.
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this part of the Article, therefore, I provide more clarity to what
I mean by the term “climate change winner” and then examine
evidence regarding whether any people and businesses will
perceive themselves to be winners.
A. DEFINING CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS
Within the social sciences, “[t]he idea that global change
produces winners and losers has become more or less accepted
77
in the common discourse.” Think, for example, of sweeping
technological change such as the Internet, or globalization of
trade and the economy, or large-scale war, or the vast political
upheavals experienced in many regions of the world—is it conceivable that these global forces of change produce only winners, or only losers, or are completely neutral? Any such claim
78
would be taken as ludicrous. Why would climate change be
any different?
But what exactly do we mean by “winners” and “losers” in
the context of global change? Their definitions have received
little discussion in the global change literature. However, geographers Karen O’Brien and Robin Leichenko recently provided
a systematic theoretical examination of these concepts using
79
economic globalization and climate change as case studies.
The general framework they develop for thinking about winners and losers under scales of global change is especially use80
ful in the context of climate change impacts.
First, “winners” and “losers” in the global change context
are usually meant to refer not to static characterizations reflecting current inequalities, but to “dynamic characterizations
that emphasize identification of winners and losers following
81
an event or in conjunction with longer-term processes.” To be
sure, the pre-existing inequalities may influence who are winners and losers as the dynamic changes play out, but the global

77. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 89.
78. See supra note 67. Nor is global change, with its winners and losers, a
new phenomenon. See CHARLES C. MANN, 1493 (2011) (providing a detailed
history of global change impacts during the 1400s–1600s).
79. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 89; see
also Karen L. O’Brien & Robin M. Leichenko, Double Exposure: Assessing the
Impacts of Climate Change Within the Context of Economic Globalization, 10
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 221 (2000) [hereinafter O’Brien & Leichenko, Double
Exposure].
80. O’Brien & Leichenko, Double Exposure, supra note 79, at 223–25.
81. O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 90.
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change process may amplify, ameliorate, or alter those patterns
82
of inequality.
Second, the dynamic characterizations most pertinent to
global change involve structural processes rather than the
more conventional idea of winners and losers from specific vol83
untary events. Thus, “structural winners and losers emerge
from larger societal processes or changes, whereby the distribution of the impacts is unequal, such that gains and losses ac84
crue differentially to participants.” Moreover, the winners and
losers are not necessarily participating in the global change
process by choice, and their knowledge of all the gains and loss85
es throughout the global system may be incomplete.
Third, winning and losing can be thought of in absolute or
relative terms. Absolute wins and losses are judged based on
comparison of one’s status before and after the relevant event
or change, whereas relative wins and losses are judged based
86
on comparison to the situation of others. Someone who is better off in relative terms might feel like a winner even if he or
she is not better off in absolute terms, just as someone better
off in absolute terms may feel like a loser if he or she is worse
87
off in relative terms.
Fourth, the identification of winners and losers could be
based on self-identification by the winners and losers themselves or on a third-party judgment, such as a government
agency measuring various metrics of gains and losses and an88
nouncing who has won and who has lost. Self-identification
has the advantage of setting the criteria internally, which obviates the need for agreement on the metrics but opens the door
to a host of political and personal motives for misidentifica89
tion. Similarly, if external third-party metrics are used, the
assessment of what counts as gains and losses could be framed
according to purely neoclassical economic indicators such as income, or on Marxian political-economic theory that includes
consideration of political power imbalances and economic de82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 90–91.
89. For example, there may be psychological motives for individuals to
self-identify as winners to claim superiority or as losers to seek sympathy and
aid. See id.
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pendency; in either case requiring subjective decisions by the
90
third-party assessment authority.
Lastly, the scale at which winners and losers are assessed
is vitally important for understanding the political and econom91
ic impacts of global change. Aggregating “wins” and “losses” at
smaller scales to assess the “net” status at larger scales can
92
mask the presence of winners and losers at the smaller scale.
A net loser nation, for example, could have many “winner” individuals and businesses within its borders, and even significant net winner regions and industries, just as a winner nation
93
could have many losers.
My interest in identifying climate change winners is in assessing their potential impacts on the politics of climate change
mitigation and adaptation. Consistent with most treatments of
the topic, I am primarily concerned, therefore, with how people
and businesses at local scales self-identify their absolute and
relative changes in situation from economic gains and losses
throughout the dynamic, structural process of global climate
94
change. To clarify this definition further, consider what it includes and excludes.
First, I am concerned with what people and businesses believe they are based on their absolute and relative self95
assessments, not what government agencies or other organi96
zations tell them they are. Of course, never mentioning climate change winners in official statements, or even calling all
people climate change losers, might condition people against
self-identifying as winners, but that framing strategy can only
go so far in the face of tangible climate change benefits. In any
event, I cover the evidence on self-identification and framing

90. See id. at 91–92.
91. See id. at 98 (stating that the assessments of winners and losers from
climate change are further complicated with issues relating to spatial and
temporal scales).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 97 (“Winners are usually referred to in terms of improved
conditions, opportunities, positive effects, and benefits . . . .”).
95. Although people who are relative winners but significant absolute losers are unlikely to exhibit the kind of policy preferences of concern to my inquiry, belief that one is a winner is all that matters to my analysis. Whether a
person or business arrives at that conclusion based on relative comparisons,
absolute comparisons, or a hybrid is inconsequential.
96. See O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 90–
91.
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later, as the ultimate number of winners does not affect how we
define who they are.
Second, I measure winner status in purely economic terms,
not through a political theory frame. It is likely that some people and businesses who are winners under my definition might
put that status in the political back seat were they to perceive
they are disfavored by strong political imbalances or economic
97
dependencies separately wrought by climate change. However, there is little research on the political effects—even less
than what exists on economic benefits. Hence, while recognizing the potential for such perceptions to offset economic gains
in terms of how people self-identify, in the absence of firm evidence supporting such an effect in the context of climate
change, I limit my definition to a neoclassical economics version
of gains and losses.
Third, I am concerned with sub-national scales, particularly local scales at which winners could concentrate sufficiently
to dominate political discourse. Most legal scholarship has focused on whether the United States is a potential winner
among nations and how the winner nations (generally the developed economies) should assist the loser nations (generally
developing nations not significantly responsible for past green98
house gas emissions). Although those questions surely will
play into domestic climate policy, uneven distribution of winners and losers within the United States is potentially a far
more divisive political force.
Finally, it is likely that many people and businesses will
thrive during climate change for reasons unrelated to climate
change benefits; for example, through the effects of globalized
99
trade and technological innovations. Winners in that category
might oppose mitigation policy because of its cost or some other
reason, but that is not my concern. There is already no shortage of such people and businesses, so having more or less of
them does not present a qualitatively different policy dynamic.
What we should care about, in other words, are people and
businesses who believe they are better off economically as a result of climate change. They are the climate change winners.

97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98. See id. at 97–98.
99. See id. at 94 –97.
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B. WILL THE WINNERS KNOW WHO THEY ARE?
One skeptical about the importance of climate change winners might assert that most people or businesses, notwithstanding their receipt of climate change benefits sufficient to
plausibly support their self-identification as climate change
winners so defined, will nonetheless not self-identify as winners. Arguably, an overwhelming moral sense of others’ suffering, or a fear of the general global instability likely to be
wrought by climate change, or a deep shame in claiming winner
status among the sea of losers, could dissuade anyone who benefits substantially because of climate change from selfidentifying as a climate change winner. Yet, while arguments
such as these present profound moral and behavioral questions,
very little is known about what people and businesses actually
think and say about climate change benefits and their possible
status as winners, because no studies have asked the right
100
questions. Indeed, even studies purporting objectively and in
balanced framings to test and evaluate peoples’ knowledge of
climate change and its impacts systematically omit references
101
to possible benefits. In perhaps the most blatant of all such
examples, a task force of the American Psychological Association explicitly wrote climate change winners out of the picture
based not on any evidence there will be no winners, but on its
own ethical orientation, arguing that mention of winners negates concern about “losers.”
It neglects the interdependency among people and assumes that the
misfortune of some will have little or no negative impact on those who
have benefitted . . . . Further, attending to the adverse impacts of climate change is consistent with the psychological ethical principle of
avoiding harm and ensuring human welfare and psychologists’ work
100. With one exception, see infra note 108, I have located no survey of
public attitudes on climate change asking in any meaningful detail about perceived benefits of climate change.
101. One survey, for example, asked respondents whether they agree that
“global warming will increase crop yields in some places, and decrease it in
others” and “will cause some places to get wetter, while others will get drier,”
but otherwise identified no potential benefits associated with such effects. See
ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & NICOLAS SMITH, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE COMMC’N, KNOWLEDGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE ACROSS GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 37–38 (2010). Another survey asked people in one county
to describe effects they had experienced and expected to experience from climate change, but offered only adverse effects such as “forest fires,” “public
health problems,” and “more insects such as ticks and mosquitoes.” See Karen
Akerlof et al., Do People “Personally Experience” Global Warming, and If So
How, and Does It Matter?, GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.07.006.

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS

237

with marginalized groups who are most apt to experience negative
impacts. For reasons such as these, we focus on the risks and nega102
tive impacts of climate change.

None of the reasons given, however, is a good reason to ignore how people will perceive climate change benefits and their
potential status as winners. Speaking of winners does not negate concern about losers. Indeed, as I explain later in the Article, not paying attention to winners only exacerbates the barriers to effective mitigation and adaptation policies designed to
help climate change losers. Given that we know benefits will
occur, such biased studies thus systematically fail to provide a
complete picture of what people believe about climate change
and how they form those beliefs.
It is difficult to learn much about how people perceive climate change benefits from studies framing climate change as
only a harmful phenomenon, because how the impacts of climate change are framed in attitude survey questions is likely
to change how respondents describe their perceptions of climate
change. As psychologists Alexa Spence and Nick Pidgeon explain:
[W]hat we individually consider to be ‘dangerous’ climate change involves at minimum judgments about uncertain and complex science,
potential impacts far into the future, as well as the perceptions and
values we use to establish whether a particular outcome is acceptable
or not. As a result, it is impossible to present information about climate change in a neutral manner without some kind of context, and
therefore the way in which such information is ‘framed’ is para103
mount.

They found, for example, that people are more receptive to
climate change mitigation policy if it is framed as providing a
104
benefit rather than avoiding a loss. It stands to reason that
people may also respond differently about climate change if
studies include questions framed around the sources of market
and nonmarket benefits from climate change.
Indeed, we do learn from some studies—biased as they
may be against recognition of climate change benefits—that
102. TASK FORCE ON THE INTERFACE BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY & GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, PSYCHOLOGY & GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTIFACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF
CHALLENGES 14 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/science/about/
publications/climate_change.aspx.
103. Alexa Spence & Nick Pidgeon, Framing and Communicating Climate
Change: The Effects of Distance and Outcome Frame Manipulations, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 656, 657 (2010).
104. Id. at 664.
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people are not ruling out the possibility of being winners. Some
even seem to relish the idea. For example, in a series of surveys
Anthony Leiserowitz and Nicolas Smith conducted, when asked
generally whether climate change overall would be more beneficial than harmful, almost a third of respondents said that is
105
“definitely false.” Significantly, however, the same number
said that this was only “probably false,” a little over a quarter
of respondents did not know, and a combined twelve percent
said it was “probably true” or “definitely true” that climate
106
change would be more beneficial than harmful. And while
almost two-thirds of respondents in that survey believe that
climate change on balance will probably or definitely be harmful overall, significant numbers in a related survey leave room
for themselves being among the winners, or at least not significant losers. Only about a third of respondents believed they will
be harmed by climate change “a great deal” or “a moderate
amount,” whereas over half believe they will be harmed “only a
little” or “not at all” and just under a half believe climate
107
change will harm their families “only a little” or “not at all.”
More on point, climate change researchers J.P. Palutikof,
M.D. Agnew, and M.R. Hoaret asked people in Scotland and
Southern England a series of questions framed around the climate extremes of hot dry summers and unusually warm win108
ters.
Respondents evidenced “deep concerns about global
warming tempered by an appreciation that there is potential
109
for both positive and negative outcomes.” Respondents from
Scotland, where it is colder and wetter than Southern England,
saw more positives, including improved agriculture, tourism,
and lower energy costs as market benefits and greater sociabil110
ity and increased outdoor activity as nonmarket benefits,
leading the researchers to conclude that “regional differences in
climate could at least in part explain the apparent geographic
105. LEISEROWITZ & SMITH, supra note 101, at 40. The survey preparers
explain that they view the question not as one of truth or falsity but “ultimately a value judgment.” Id. at 77.
106. Id. at 40.
107. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND: AMERICANS’ GLOBAL WARMING BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES IN MAY 2011, at 4 (2011) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ, BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES].
108. Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 43.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 54 –58.
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differences in responses.” Of course, people who believe they
will be better off may turn out to be wrong, but they may be
right. The point is that people do seem to be forming their own
methods of climate impact assessment and, whether accurate
or not, forming beliefs about their potential loser or winner status.
How will people make those assessments as climate change
harms and benefits begin to take hold over the landscape and
throughout the economy in more tangible forms than they have
thus far? For one thing, a number of objective metrics will be
available, such as the days in growing seasons, the household
heating bill, profits from sale of climate proofing materials,
and, obviously, the temperature. Even with these available indicators, it is unlikely that people or businesses will be able to
comprehensively and objectively evaluate all the market and
nonmarket impacts of climate change and arrive at accurate
personal cost-benefit calculations. They are more likely to rely
heavily on subjective and relative assessments about what is
most important to them to decide whether life is good. For example, demographers Sammy Zahran, Samuel D. Brody,
Himanshu Grover, and Arnold Vedlitz framed a number of scenarios designed to present what the authors believed would
present objective risks from climate change. They found that
risk perception, rather than objective risk, is “far more robust”
for explaining how people conceive climate change will affect
112
their lives. To say the least, however, risk perception is a
highly complex phenomenon riddled with cognitive processes
that can lead to departures between objective and perceived
113
risks.
It is also unclear the extent to which people and businesses
will connect life being good (or bad), or better (or worse), to climate change. Palutikof, Agnew, and Hoaret conclude from their
studies, however, that respondents “indicate[d] a high level of
114
awareness of the impacts of climate extremes.”
Similarly,
Spence and Pidgeon summarize the literature showing people
can distinguish between personal and societal impacts of climate change, with personal risks often judged to be lower than
115
societal risks.
People thus seem to be assigning climate
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 43.
Zahran et al., supra note 38, at 784.
Id. at 774 –76.
Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 43.
See Spence & Pidgeon, supra note 103, at 657.
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change as the causal source of particular social and personal
116
harms and benefits. Again, their assessments may be wrong,
but they may be right, the point being that people are consciously perceiving climate change as a source of harms and
benefits.
Although I cannot resolve these complex cognitive questions, a few observations offer compelling reasons to pay closer
attention to climate change benefits and winners. First, if it is
in fact the case that people and businesses simply cannot connect climate change as a causal source of harms and benefits in
their and others’ lives and livelihoods, there is little reason to
believe that effective mitigation policy will ever gain traction.
People would simply seek private and public investment in adaptation, not knowing that they are adapting to climate
change, and would pay little attention to any need to invest in
mitigation. Alternatively, if it seems more likely that people
and businesses will not be entirely oblivious to what is going on
around them, particularly given how prevalent climate change
is in the media and politics, then it follows that they will make
connections between climate change and its harms and benefits. That is, why would there be cognitive asymmetry in that
people have the capacity to recognize only climate change
harms? Why would a farmer, for example, attribute introduction of a new pest or weed to climate change, but not make a
similar association regarding the consistently lengthening
growing season, thinking it is just a case of long-term serendipity? Comprehensively or not, accurately or not, it seems far
more likely from the limited attitudinal studies thus far touching on climate change benefits that people will begin to attach
climate change as the causal source of some of the losses and
gains they experience in life.
Assuming that is the case, will any people or businesses
perceiving substantial benefits from climate change have reason to conclude they are winners, and will their numbers be
substantial? At one level this is an empirical question—will
benefits outweigh harms in the minds of many? At another level it is a behavioral question—will such people and businesses
decide to think like winners? On the empirical component, although climate change benefits have been systematically understudied, what attention has been given to them suggests
that many winners will emerge. As explained previously in
116. Id.; see also Akerlof et al., supra note 101, at 8.
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Part I, the agriculture sector is likely to have substantial areas
of improved conditions over the next one hundred years, particularly when efficient adaptations are factored in. If some of
the models are correct, moreover, overall economic performance
in the United States over the next one hundred years is not
117
grim by any means. Even assuming it falls clearly on the
negative side, presumably there will be a distribution of individual personal and business outcomes with some falling on the
positive side.
Of course, as is explained in more detail later in the Article, all such gains for people and businesses are likely to be
transitory over long timeframes without effective global mitigation policies eventually being put in place. But that does not
avoid the question of what to do about people and businesses
who believe they are winners over near terms. If you do not believe there will be any of them in the next one hundred years,
or not enough to matter, the prospect of climate change winners is a blip on the climate policy screen not worth worrying
about. Yet even if you believe that there very well may be a
substantial number of people (and thus possibly entire communities), and businesses (and thus possibly entire industries)
over the next one hundred years who believe they are climate
change winners and behave like winners, you still might also
question whether they will have any policy significance. In other words, will having them think and behave like winners present substantial policy challenges? I turn to that question in
the next part of the Article.
III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CLIMATE CHANGE
WINNERS
Based on the studies discussed in Parts I and II, we can
reasonably assume that climate change benefits will flow to
substantial numbers of people and businesses and that many of
the beneficiaries will perceive themselves to be climate change
winners. So what? Will they make any difference in climate policy? There is every reason to believe they will at the very least
complicate the politics of climate mitigation and adaptation,
possibly suppressing support for greenhouse gas regulation and
diverting resources away from harm-reducing adaptation
measures. Of course, it is every bit as likely that climate
117. Again, the methods and outcomes of IAMs, and even the propriety of
using them at all, are hotly contested matters. See supra note 6.
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change losers will want their say in climate policy, and that
their interests will often diverge from the winners’ interests.
Climate policy, in other words, is soon to become not just about
a tradeoff between the present and the future, but also a
tradeoff between winners and losers at any given time. Hence it
is worth us thinking now about how climate change winners
will think about climate policy.
A. THINKING LIKE A CLIMATE CHANGE WINNER
It is well established that the public is currently divided
118
over climate policy and the extent of climate change harms.
Because no attitude studies ask people about climate change
benefits in any detail, however, respondents are never put in
the position of evaluating climate policy from the perspective of
having received climate change benefits, much less being a climate change winner. And since there are not yet any substantial climate change benefits to be secured, we do not know
much about how people will really behave in the political arena
once there are.
Acknowledging this vacuum of behavioral knowledge, several factors suggest the emergence of climate change winners
across the nation will be complex and problematic for climate
policy. Consider first that because of the “committed warming”
119
effect, climate policy is currently centered around a debate
over whether, how, by how much, and when to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions, which only well after that would stabilize
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, which only
well after that would (possibly) stabilize the climate in some
120
new (presently unknown) set of conditions.
118. See LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MARCH 2012, supra note 39, passim (policy opposition); LEISEROWITZ, PUBLIC SUPPORT MAY 2011, supra note
39, passim (policy opposition); LEISEROWITZ, BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES, supra
note 107, passim (disbelief ).
119. The committed warming effect stems from the fact that “no matter
how aggressively heat-trapping emissions are reduced, some amount of climate change and resulting impacts will continue due to effects of gases that
have already been released.” U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 11.
120. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 72 (“Anthropogenic
warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries even if GHG emissions were to be reduced sufficiently for GHG concentrations to stabilize, due
to the time scales associated with climate processes and feedbacks.”); Richard
A. Kerr, How Urgent Is Climate Change?, 318 SCIENCE 1230, 1230 (2007)
(“The system has built-in time lags. Ice sheets take centuries to melt after a
warming. The atmosphere takes decades to be warmed by today’s greenhouse
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This means no person alive today is likely to experience the
hoped-for climate benefits of mitigation policy put in place today. In fact, no person living at any point in time now and into
the distant future is likely to experience the climate benefits of
regulatory policies put into place during his or her lifetime.
Moreover, it is difficult to model with much precision exactly
what greenhouse gas emission reduction is needed to stabilize
climate and when and by how much any future climate stabili121
zation effects will accrue from any given regulatory scenario.
As Professor Eric Biber has comprehensively outlined, this
double-whammy of the delayed effects and uncertain outcomes
of mitigation policy makes convincing the public to invest in
and bear the costs of aggressive emissions regulation measures
a tough sell politically—it asks people at any given time to
make sacrifices in their lives for the unknown chance of reducing unknown harms by an unknown extent on behalf of un122
known numbers of people at an unknown point in the future.
Now add to that dynamic the climate change winners dynamic. Given that climate change will take place for hundreds
of years into the future regardless of mitigation policies taken
today or at any point in the next one hundred years, there will
be a class of people along the way who perceive their situation
to be improving because of climate change—people who notice
their growing season is lengthening, their beaches are more
pleasant, their outdoor recreation business is picking up, their
new climate proofing invention is selling like mad. Persuading
gas emissions.”); V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead,
105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245, 14245 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4°C even if greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009) (estimating a 1000-year
committed warming effect).
121. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 –47 (discussing various emission stabilisation scenarios and impact projections), 73 (“Uncertainty
in the equilibrium climate sensitivity creates uncertainty in the expected
warming for a given CO2-eq stabilisation scenario. Uncertainty in the carbon
cycle feedback creates uncertainty in the emissions trajectory required to
achieve a particular stabilisation level.”).
122. See generally Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009) (identifying ways to reduce the likely backlash
against regulations of delayed climate change harms); Eric Biber, Climate
Change, Causation, and Delayed Harm, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 975 (2009) (focusing on how delayed responses shape the climate change debate); Lazarus, supra note 18 (arguing how legislators should insulate climate change legislation
against short-term concerns).
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these climate change winners to get behind mitigation policies
seems an even taller political task than climate policymakers
have with today’s voters. And regardless of their mitigation policy positions, people and businesses anticipating a rosier lifetime for themselves and their successors because of climate
change are likely to demand infrastructure investment and
other public policies that support the delivery of those bene123
fits. They are also likely to make private investments that
entrench them in their beneficial climate change future, and
thus may not take kindly to public policy measures designed to
unwind those benefits.
The psychological account of public opinion on climate
change mitigation policy supports these expectations. Even
without experience of climate change benefits, many people and
businesses are generally dug in against investing in effective
mitigation. One factor is biased assimilation of mixed evidence
about a topic, which leads people to select the evidence that
124
strengthens their preconceptions. Professor Jeff Rachlinski
has explained why the scientific evidence on climate change is
sufficiently contested and ambiguous to lead to biased assimila125
tions, which has further polarized peoples’ views. People also
generally exhibit loss aversion, making people “relatively unwilling to sacrifice benefits they already possess to obtain other
126
benefits,”
particularly when the other benefits are so far
127
off. These and other effects have seriously impeded public
support for climate change mitigation, and surely could be no
less in play for climate change winners.
For example, numerous studies have shown that people
will take environmental action if they perceive that there are
high overall risks from nonaction, that the risks of nonaction
threaten their personal welfare, or that the benefits of action
123. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 370, 381
(2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessmen
t_report_wg2_report_impacts_adaptation_and_vulnerability.htm (describing
the relationship between climate change and changing infrastructure needs,
and noting that some major updates are already underway).
124. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 304 –05.
125. See id. at 304 –06.
126. Id. at 307.
127. See generally Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based
Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet),
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2006).
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128

exceed the costs. These behavioral trigger conditions are consistent with attitude study findings that “what drives support
for costly climate change policies is the extent to which citizens
regard climate change as threatening to their material well129
being.” People who do not perceive climate change as threatening their material well-being, but instead see themselves as
climate change winners, can thus be expected to deliver even
less support for climate change mitigation. People today also
say they are not willing to pay much even when their payment
130
would assure a solution to climate change, so consider how
much less they would be willing to pay if they believe they are
climate change winners. In short, if many people in twenty-five
years believe they are climate change winners, the evidence is
that they will likely integrate evidence that supports their
views, be reluctant to jeopardize their benefits, and generally
not care as much about supporting climate change mitigation
given their lower levels of perceived risk. Indeed, this exact effect held true in a study of people in Scotland and Southern
England, leading to the conclusion that “[s]o long as people
comprehend climate change as personally beneficial, despite
identifying it as a problem for the UK as a whole, they are unlikely to consider the need for personal activities to mitigate
131
climate change as important.”
In areas where such climate change winners are concentrated geographically or sectorally—where whole communities
of people and businesses see themselves as winners or where
winners are concentrated economically through industry-wide
ties—what are their political representatives to say in response
to their positions on climate change mitigation and adaptation?
How successful will a politician in a winner district, or in a district dominated by a winner industry, be by running on a platform supporting aggressive mitigation regulation, with an exclusive focus on harm-reducing adaptation? Given evidence
that legislators in jurisdictions with high greenhouse gas emis128. See Zahran et al., supra note 38, at 774.
129. Id. at 784.
130. One study on willingness to pay found that less than a third of respondents were willing to spend more than $25 per month, even assuming
such payments when amassed would allow policymakers to “solve” climate
change. See THOMAS E. CURRY ET AL., LAB. FOR ENERGY & ENV’T, A SURVEY OF
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSES OF 2006 RESULTS
19–20 (2007).
131. Palutikof et al., supra note 31, at 58.
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sions tend not to support greenhouse gas regulation
132
measures, there is every reason to believe that politicians in
winner districts will actively pursue the interests of their constituents. Clearly, therefore, the emergence of climate change
winners and their concentration in many political districts will
present new kinds of political struggles for climate policy as
legislators from expected winner and loser districts are unlikely
to agree easily on local, state, regional, and national policy di133
rections.
These effects are complicated even further by the fact that
who and where the climate change winners are will shift over
time. Most studies that bother to include benefits in the analysis “point to initial benefits of a modest increase in tempera134
ture, followed by losses as temperatures increase further.”
This means climate change winners are likely to start emerging
in large numbers relatively early in the era of climate change
impacts. But climate change will not stop on the dime to let
them bask indefinitely in the benefits. For example, farmers in
one region that begin experiencing lengthening growing seasons may like to have that continue and thus may oppose, or at
least fail to support, emission regulation efforts. At some point,
however, rising temperatures, invasive pests, and other side effects of climate change will turn those winners into climate
135
change losers. But there will be another set of climate change
winners to take their places, as other regions begin to benefit
from continued climate change. It may take many such cycles
and thus many centuries before rising global temperatures and
other effects adverse to agriculture outpace the adaptive capac136
ity to secure the flow of benefits in all regions. In short, over
the next one hundred years climate change winners will likely
begin to emerge across the landscape, shift gradually around
the landscape, and demand attention along the way.

132. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 25, passim.
133. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 41–42.
134. TOL, supra note 13, at 9 (based on a synthesis of numerous economic
studies).
135. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 2, at 12
(“Many crops show positive responses to elevated carbon dioxide and low levels
of warming, but higher levels of warming often negatively affect growth and
yields.”).
136. Even then, there might still be businesses and other entities that benefit from climate change indirectly, such as air conditioning and insulation installation businesses. See supra Part I.B.
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Adding this shifting winners and losers effect to the already snarly climate policy scene makes for a rather complex
mosaic of interests. At any given point in time over the next
one hundred years and beyond, each person, community, business, and industry will have an initial perceived net climate
impacts starting point—net loser, winner, or neutral—and a
projected future trajectory of net harms and benefits over their
relevant planning horizon toward net loser, winner, or neutral.
How people and businesses view mitigation and adaptation policy—assuming they act primarily out of self-interest—will depend on how they perceive their respective present and future
climate change impacts profile, and how they perceive different
mitigation and adaptation policies will affect that profile. For
example, a person with a net losing starting point but increasingly net positive trajectory might increasingly oppose public
investment in mitigation, or at best not actively support it, but
at the same time enthusiastically support ramped up investments in adaptation measures designed to secure the anticipated benefits stream. By contrast, a business that is a net winner
at one point in time but projects an increasingly losing trajectory is more likely to increase its support for mitigation and support immediate investment in infrastructure both to secure the
present benefits and to avoid the future harms.
To be sure, not all winners will be in lockstep opposition to
mitigation policy and myopically focus on benefit-securing adaptation. Although I have assumed self-interested behavior, it
is of course true that people define their interests in many different ways. A winner might support mitigation policy because
of an overriding political affiliation, for example, or may support harm-reducing adaptation out of altruistic motives. Some
winners might even support mitigation in the belief they can
lock in a beneficial climate regime in a few decades. My point is
not to pigeonhole people and businesses, but to draw attention
to the likelihood that the emergence of classes of climate
change winners and losers is likely to make climate policy far
more contested than it already is. Given the evidence that people tend to base their climate policy positions on, among other
things, their perceptions of their climate change impacts profiles, as real harms and benefits become widespread, the climate change winners are likely, on average, to lend less sup-
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port to mitigation policy and more support to benefit-securing
137
adaptation policy.
There are several important observations to be made about
138
this policy dynamic. First, it does not apply only to the scale
of individual people and businesses. As explained above, direct
climate change benefits are likely to concentrate in areas of biophysical change, which means that whole communities may
self-identify as winners. It is likely, in other words, that some
local and even state political districts will on the whole flip into
net winner status. Second, even at the individual person and
business scale, it matters for the politics who they are. Some
people and businesses will profit immensely from climate
change, and thus may exert disproportional influence on local,
state, or federal policymakers to pursue their policy interests.
Third, it may not take much net movement into winner status
to make a person or business feel like a winner. In other words,
it may take only a slight tip in the balance for a person, business, or community to start thinking like a climate change
winner. Finally, some individuals, towns, regions, states, businesses, and industries will change status over time, while others remain relatively static.
At any point in time, in other words, people and their
communities, businesses and their industries, and political districts at all scales will be distributed in various climate change
impacts profiles, and twenty-five or fifty years later the configuration could be much different. Moreover, all of these effects
are equally true for climate change losers, and for everyone in
between, which means that the political landscape on climate
policy will become increasingly patchy, dynamic, and potentially quite volatile.
137. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 525 (2007) (“[I]f Americans
doubt the risk of serious harm [from climate change], they might well resist
significant or costly regulatory responses.”).
138. My focus is primarily on attitudes toward mitigation and adaptation
policy. It is entirely possible that climate change winners also will be more
likely than losers to resist or ignore government efforts to change behaviors
associated with greenhouse gas emissions, either because they engage in more
consumptive behavior or simply care less about the effects of their emissions
footprints. This could complicate strategies to leverage a “behavioral wedge”
approach to mitigation, through which relatively simple and nonintrusive
changes in personal and business behavior can significantly reduce aggregate
emissions. See Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 18452, 18452–55 (2009).
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This is clearly not the linear “loser only” scenario one finds
repeated in climate change policy studies and legal scholarship.
The point should be clear by now: over the next one hundred
years, climate change winners and losers of all sorts will begin
to emerge and shift around across the landscape. Who they are,
where they are, and how prevalent they are in any region will
shift continually across time and space. There is little chance
that this dynamic will not influence climate change politics.
The question that motivates this Article, therefore, is:
What will the conversation sound like when the losers and the
winners in countless urban and rural communities around the
nation meet at coffee shops and water coolers and the topic of
climate change comes up? I do not purport to have any superior
insight into the psychology behind where and when people,
communities, businesses, industries, and political jurisdictions
place themselves in the winner versus loser matrix, or how
they engage the policy debate given where they land. It is difficult to conceive of a future in which no such entities believe
they are climate change winners, and it is naïve to assume all
those who do consider themselves winners will stay in line with
the themes of aggressive mitigation and harm-reducing adaptation. As Richard Lazarus aptly alluded to in his impressive
analysis of the current state of climate change politics:
The potential for short-term benefits from climate change in nations
like the United States will fuel other climate change lawmaking skeptics. Those who believe they have something to gain, whether from
predictions of enhanced agricultural productivity or access to new energy resources, will be naturally reluctant to join a coalition favoring
139
climate change legislation.

What will we do about the climate change winners among
us then? Of course, whatever we do about winners, we should
not necessarily be concerned about a future full of climate
change winners now.
B. WHY WORRY NOW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS?
There is every reason to believe that as actual and prospective climate change winner and loser status becomes more tangible, winners and losers will begin to place contested demands
on mitigation and adaptation policies. Yet the consequence of
stifling talk of climate change winners is that climate policy
has no theory of what to do about their presence in this policy
dynamic. Legal scholars have acted as if the future includes on139. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 1185.
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ly climate change losers who will actively support aggressive
mitigation and harm-reducing adaptation once they perceive
they are losers, and thus have focused only on whether and
how to achieve those climate change policies. But if at any
point in time fifty million or more people, tens of thousands or
more businesses, and thousands or more communities and political units in the United States believe they and the people of
the future they care most about would be better off were climate change to continue its course, one has to expect that they
will place demands on policy that may not be consonant with
aggressive mitigation and harm-reducing adaptation policies.
Clearly, climate policy must focus on those who will suffer under climate change, but what should we do about the climate
change winners? Climate policy has not openly considered this
question—it has formulated no answer for what to say if substantial numbers of climate change winners throughout the nation demand that policy focus on retaining or enhancing the
benefits they expect to enjoy as a result of climate change.
To be sure, climate policy has had to deal openly with the
sacrifices some people will have to make under an aggressive
mitigation regime, such as through higher energy prices or
140
shifting employment opportunities. The standard policy response has been that any such sacrifices are morally, if not also
economically, justified to make now to avoid far more serious
141
harms to future generations. More optimistically, policymakers trumpet the prospect of green jobs and other positive economic spinoffs of a climate change mitigation regime as softening the impacts of regulation to present and near-term
142
generations. The debate over these policy tradeoffs is already
143
in full gear in legal scholarship, to be sure.
140. See generally NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
THE STERN REVIEW (2007) (comprehensively studying costs and benefits of
climate change mitigation policies such as regulation of greenhouse gas emissions); Bruce A. Babcock, Costs and Benefits to Agriculture from Climate
Change Policy, IOWA AG REV., Summer 2009, at 1 (focusing on impacts of different regulatory policies on agricultural sector).
141. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian, Climate
Change and Future Generations, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097 (2011) (parsing out
common justifications for intergenerational discounting and arguing that
morally, people should value future generations as highly as they do their
own).
142. See Dorceta E. Taylor, Green Jobs and the Potential to Diversify the
Environmental Workforce, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 47 (2011) (“At the apogee of the 2008 election cycle not a day passed without mention of green jobs
or green collar workers.”); see, e.g., THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., GREEN
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But this is not the tradeoff problem I am suggesting the
policy world and legal scholars have yet to confront in any coherent way. It is one thing that greenhouse gas emission regulations may cause some people alive today to lose their “brown”
jobs while others gain more lucrative “green” employment. The
focus of climate policy has been whether to pursue regulation to
avoid making people alive in the future worse off because of
climate change—to limit the number of climate change losers.
Doing so requires making (or forcing) changes in present behavior that will inevitably make some people in the near term
worse off and some better off compared to their lot under the
status quo. They are made worse or better off not because of
climate change, however, but because of present policy choices
made to influence future climate change trends and impacts.
The phenomenon I am concerned with has to do with people, businesses, and communities in the future believing they
have been made better off because of climate change, not because of climate change policy. Few today would claim to be
this kind of climate change winner, because there have not
been enough climate change impacts in the United States to
make anyone feel as if it has made them much better or worse
144
off. The issue, therefore, has not been put into play. In fifty
years, however, there may be many millions of people and
thousands of businesses and communities who begin finding or
anticipating sufficient benefits from climate change to think of

JOBS: A PATHWAY TO A STRONG MIDDLE CLASS, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
assets/documents/mctf_one_staff_report_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2012)
(providing information about climate change policies including green jobs
impacts).
143. See generally, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 MO.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 326 (2009) (challenging arguments that a green jobs
economy will develop and will, among other things, offset costs of greenhouse
gas regulation); Jason Scott Johnston, Global Warming Advocacy Science: A
Cross Examination (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 10-08, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612851 (challenging arguments for stronger mitigation regulation).
144. When asked to respond to the statement “I have personally experienced the effects of global warming,” over two-thirds of 1010 adult Americans
surveyed in 2010 disagreed at least somewhat. LEISEROWITZ, BELIEFS AND
ATTITUDES, supra note 107, at 18. Neither this question nor any other in the
survey asked respondents to differentiate between beneficial and harmful effects, but rather only focused on the harmful effects. See id. Similarly, only
twenty-seven percent of adults asked the same question in a county-wide
study agreed, with over one-third of respondents strongly or somewhat disagreeing and over one third undecided. Akerlof et al., supra note 101, at 3.
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themselves as winners. Like most winners, many of them will
want to stay winners.
So why have legal scholars devoted no attention to what to
do about climate change winners? Perhaps one reason not to
bother thinking about climate change winners is that there are
not many out there yet and we can begin worrying about their
policy positions when they begin expressing them. This logic
falls apart, however, considering that there are not many climate change losers out there yet either. Climate change has only just begun to take sufficient hold to allow identification of
harms and benefits, meaning the policy rationales necessarily
are focused on impacts to future generations. Why would the
prospect of future generations of losers be the reason for policy
to attend to their interests now, but the prospect of future generations of winners would be the reason for policy not to account for them now? Clearly, if we are going to ignore the climate change winners problem, there has to be more reason for
it than because they are off in the future. Otherwise, we should
also be ignoring the climate change losers problem.
One such reason to ignore climate change winners but not
losers could be that, simply put, they are winners, not losers.
No matter how large in number, their gains are windfalls made
possible only because of a phenomenon causing suffering to
others. Like those who benefit from war or natural disasters,
therefore, we should not countenance any demands by them to
lock in their gains by allowing climate change to persist or to
stabilize at levels adverse to large populations. To be sure,
some people may be unappealing climate change winners because they seek economic opportunity in climate change—for
example, someone who builds seawalls may do a brisk business
in coastal areas or someone who moves from one area to another to seek better conditions. But many climate change winners
will benefit more passively, such as a farmer whose crops thrive
because of a longer growing season, and many climate change
winners will be people whose lives may improve just barely
above subsistence levels thanks to the extra water or warmth
climate change provides. It will be difficult, therefore, to lump
the climate change winners into the same category as war profiteers and post-hurricane price gougers. Indeed, it is likely that
many climate change winners will present sympathetic cases,
or at least be seen as acting reasonably.
Another possible basis for ignoring climate change winners
could be that they will be too few in number, especially when

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS

253

compared to the number of climate change losers, to present
much of a policy influence. But we do not know that. Indeed,
the focus of most policy analyses has been on the adverse impacts of climate change, with very little effort devoted to modeling climate change benefits or identifying locations and num145
bers of likely beneficiaries. The potential of there being large
numbers of climate change winners distributed widely
throughout the nation thus cannot be discounted.
Nevertheless, even if climate change winners appear in
large numbers and many present sympathetic cases, another
possible argument for discounting their presence is that in all
likelihood their aggregate numbers and benefits will nonetheless be much smaller compared to the aggregate numbers and
harms of climate change losers, so they will not alter the costbenefit analysis of climate policy options by enough to worry
146
about. But we also do not know that, and we certainly cannot
say how much smaller the winners’ bounty will be compared to
the losers’ losses, even if in general that appears likely to be the
case. Regardless, even knowing with certainty that the number
of winners and their aggregate benefits will be substantially
smaller than the number of losers and their aggregate harms is
not a good reason for policy to ignore the winners; indeed, it is a
reason to pay close attention to them. As explained above, climate change winners may be concentrated in areas sufficient to
allow them to take over the climate policy of local or state political districts, and even if outnumbered by losers some politically and economically powerful climate change winners, particularly businesses aligned in winner industries, may find their
benefits highly valuable and thus worth fighting for aggressive147
ly. Hence, even if only a minority nationally and with less at
stake in the aggregate, climate change winners may be quite
vocal and aggressive in their efforts to secure their benefits and

145. See Johnston, supra note 11, at 42 (complaining that climate policy
reports offered in support of greenhouse gas regulation generally ignore the
cost-benefit analyses contained in economic studies); Mendelsohn, supra note
7, at 44 (complaining that the influential Stern Report considered only harmful effects of climate change in calculating the costs and benefits of greenhouse
gas emission regulation).
146. See TOL, supra note 13, at 17 (noting that the positive externalities of
climate change have not been quantified); supra Part I.A.1 (cautioning that
few robust studies have been conducted on how much losers will lose and winners will win in certain areas of climate change).
147. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 25, passim; Johnston, supra note 11, at
41–42.
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may be successful in many local, state, and even federal
quarters.
Perhaps the ultimate explanation for not considering what
to do about climate change winners is that extrapolating unchecked climate change trends far enough into the future leads
to global oblivion. In the final analysis, in other words, if climate change is not put under control there are only climate
change losers. Whether true or not, any such climate change
148
apocalypse would be a long way off, and it does not mean
there will not be climate change winners along the way, many
of whom might not take the long view. After all, notwithstanding the possibility of climate change oblivion, many people and
businesses today aggressively resist and even attack green149
house gas regulations in legal forums. Why should we plan
policy around the expectation that the climate change winners
of the future will behave any differently, particularly as they
will have anticipated, experienced, and even become acculturated to tangible benefits from climate change?
The response might be that climate change winners will be
more magnanimous global citizens than people today who are
opposed to greenhouse gas regulations, because they will know
that climate change is real, is a bad thing for humanity on the
whole, and is the source of their individual gains. In other
words, out of either a moral commitment or a fear of shaming,
they will do the right thing. At the very least, it would be hard
to be a climate change winner and a climate change skeptic at
the same time, so one would not expect climate change winners
150
to deny climate change as the source of their benefits. It
would be monumentally naïve, however, to assume a wholesale
norm transformation in the future as the basis for ignoring the
climate change winners policy problem in the present. Many
people work in or benefit from industries known to produce
harmful products or effects, and many of them aggressively re148. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 2, at 44 –47 (discussing impacts through and beyond the twenty-first century under different emissions
scenarios).
149. See David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate
Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L.
REV. 15, 70–85 (2012) (describing the significant component of climate change
litigation challenging government mitigation initiatives).
150. Though, even a climate change winner aware of the source of his or
her benefits could rationalize that climate change is a completely natural phenomenon and thus resistance to greenhouse gas regulation is justified as controlling emissions will have no effect on climate.
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sist regulation of the industry. Why assume that beneficiaries
of climate change will not behave the same way? Particularly
as climate change winners begin to invest in and build their
lives around the stream of benefits climate change provides
them, it is likely that many will not easily be persuaded to let
go of thinking like winners even when reminded of the source
of their bounty.
Possibly, however, the idea is that even accepting all of the
foregoing, talking about climate change winners will prompt
people to think about whether they are winners, and if they decide they are then to act like winners. Keeping a lid on the topic
thus may be more constructive to mitigation and adaptation
151
policy goals than talking openly about it. The evidence summarized above, however, suggests that people and businesses
already are on to the potential for climate change benefits even
with nary a word about the topic from official sources. Continued official silence about climate change benefits thus seems no
more likely to keep people from concluding they may be winners once the benefits start coming on line.
A final possible reason for why legal scholars are not discussing climate change winners is more personal—that doing
so might make one appear to be downplaying the magnitude of
climate change harms and the importance of implementing an
aggressive mitigation policy. Indeed, it might even be seen as
giving ammunition to opponents of greenhouse gas regulation
who will argue that the cost-benefit analysis case for regulation
suffers once climate change benefits are robustly examined and
factored in. But this is the worst reason of all to sidestep the issue. Refusing to confront the climate change winner problem
because of appearances, or because of how opponents of climate
mitigation measures might distort the message, will only assure that there is no policy in place when climate change winners begin to emerge in significant numbers. Indeed, until recently climate policy dialogue took the head-in-the-sand
approach with respect to climate change adaptation, making it
taboo to speak of adaptation of any kind—even on behalf of
helping climate change losers—out of fear that a growing confidence in adaptive capacity might deflect focus away from estab152
lishing effective mitigation policies. No wonder that mention
151. See O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14, at 99
(discussing this position).
152. E. Lisa F. Schipper and Ian Burton sum up the tension that existed
through the 1990s and well into the following decade:
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of possible climate change benefits has been buried deep in official climate change assessments in fleeting and highly qualified
153
terms. It is just not something anyone seems to want to discuss. But just as delayed attention to adaptation has left adap154
tation policy in deficit mode, so too would delaying attention
to climate change winners leave policy unprepared once they
begin to emerge in numbers across the landscape. By then it
may be too late to establish effective legal principles for managing the demands they place on mitigation and adaptation
policies.
Perhaps raising the topic of climate change winners will
not win one many green points, but the bottom line is that ignoring climate change winners will not make them go away or
behave selflessly. Their emergence will present a potentially
complex policy issue that legal scholars should take into account now. In fifty years there may be tens of millions of people
and thousands of businesses and communities in the United
States considering themselves climate change winners and
pushing on their political representatives to serve their inter155
ests. Hence, whereas climate policy of the present is about
how much to sacrifice now to limit the number of climate
change losers of the future, the climate policy of the not too distant future will be made far more complex by the emergence of
a class of climate change winners, many of whom will have the
[I]nterest in adaptation was overwhelmed by concern about the need
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Proponents of adaptation faced two obstacles that were attributed to adaptation: reducing the apparent need
for mitigation; and playing down the urgency for action. For one,
“adaptationists” were distrusted because their proposals seemed to
undermine the need for mitigation. Critics felt that belief in the potential value of adaptation would soften the resolve of governments to
grasp the nettle of mitigation and thus play into the hands of the fossil fuels interests and the climate change sceptics. In addition, because climate change was popularly perceived as a gradual process,
adaptation was not considered urgent as there would be time to adapt
when climate change and its impacts became manifest. These views
dominated in the mid and late 1990s.
E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton, Understanding Adaptation: Origins, Concepts, Practice and Policy, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 7 (E. Lisa F. Schipper & Ian Burton eds., 2009).
153. See supra note 9.
154. See Ian Burton, Climate Change and the Adaptation Deficit, in THE
EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 152, at
89, 91–92.
155. See generally O’Brien & Leichenko, Winners and Losers, supra note 14
(explaining the likely emergence of climate change winners).
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interest and wherewithal to influence the direction of policy
toward keeping their flows of benefits intact.
So, now that we know there will be substantial numbers of
people and businesses self-identifying as climate change winners and that their emergence will present complex and contested policy demands, what should we do about it and how do
we do it? The remainder of the Article turns to this question
and its related normative and positive dimensions for climate
change mitigation and adaptation policies.
IV. MITIGATION POLICY: IGNORE CLIMATE CHANGE
WINNERS
The mitigation policy I have used as the reference point for
this Article is the pursuit of aggressive greenhouse gas emission reductions. The United States has achieved little traction
toward that goal as things stand today, and the emergence of
climate change winners in the near future portends an increasingly complex and contested policy landscape. So what steps
could policymakers take now to limit the disruptive effects of
the climate change winner phenomenon on mitigation policy?
In this section I argue that the most effective policy measure
will be to ignore climate change winners. I say “ignore them”
not in the sense used thus far in the Article of ignoring their
presence, which we should not do, but rather in the sense of ignoring their benefits when formulating mitigation policy, which
we should do. In other words, mitigation policy should ignore
climate change winners not by default, but by design.
Many economists focused on producing a robust costbenefit efficiency analysis for climate change mitigation policy
are likely to object, but there are compelling reasons for supporting a mitigation policy approach that focuses principally on
achieving long-term cost-effectiveness and thus purposively
leaves valuation of climate change benefits (and harms) out of
the policy choice equation. An IAM-style cost-benefit approach
weighs the costs and benefits of stabilizing the climate under
different regulatory options, thus requiring the contentious
process of assessing and valuing future climate change harms
and benefits and also future mitigation policy harms and bene156
fits. By contrast, a cost-effectiveness approach adopts a politically determined “long run target for limiting the amount of
156. Richard D. Morgenstern, Critiquing the Critique of the Climate
Change Winner Argument, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10720, 10720 (2011).
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projected climate change or atmospheric [greenhouse gas] accumulations, and focuses on what policy trajectory might
157
achieve alternative goals at minimum economic cost.” The
latter approach does not employ assessment of harms or benefits—it focuses exclusively on the costs of achieving the legislatively-mandated policy target.
The question of which approach to use is already a matter
158
of intense debate in climate policy, without any attention given to climate change winners. The critique of relying primarily
on the cost-effectiveness approach is that the legislativelymandated targets “must come from somewhere,” and that one
of the relevant sources informing that choice necessarily is cost159
benefit analysis. The critique of relying primarily on costbenefit analysis for mitigation policy, besides its underlying
normative assumptions about the virtues of efficiency, is that it
is extraordinarily unwieldy. A multitude of factors must be integrated into a comprehensive analysis, and there is not much
certainty about many of them; across the plethora of such studies conducted to date “there are huge differences about the size
of market and nonmarket damages, and the expected cata160
strophic risks.”
The difference between these two approaches will be amplified as tangible climate change harms and benefits begin to
come on line. On the one hand, cost-effectiveness methodology
will be unaffected, as it does not incorporate assessment of
harms and benefits. By contrast, IAM-style cost-benefit analysis will become more complex as direct and indirect harms and
benefits become more prevalent, albeit measuring them will rely less on modeled predictions and more on empirical data. The
problem with the IAM approach, however, is just that—we will
be able to measure climate change benefits and thus IAM models, to be accurate, will have to incorporate them. There are two
reasons for concern in this respect. One is the need to avoid the
short term from locking the long term into a social trap. The
other reason, which is uniquely pronounced in the climate
change context, is the need to hedge against nonlinearities, tip-

157. Id.
158. See Dowlatabadi, supra note 6, at 291 (identifying the choice of costbenefit versus cost-effectiveness as a threshold question).
159. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, A Reply, 41 ENVTL. L. REP.
10726, 10726 (2011).
160. Morgenstern, supra note 156, at 10721.
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ping points, and risk profiles that complicate the physical and
economic future of climate change.
A. AVOIDING THE CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS SOCIAL TRAP
A social trap is commonly defined as “any situation in
which the short-run, local reinforcements guiding individual
behavior are inconsistent with the long-run, global best interest
161
of the individual and society.” Classic examples include the
small-scale prisoner’s dilemma game and the large-scale trage162
dy of the commons. Many environmental problems find their
163
root cause in social traps, and climate change is sizing up to
164
be one of unprecedented dimension.
Several bait factors can set the trap leading to disconnects
between short-term behavior reinforcement and desired long165
term outcome, all of which are in play in the climate change
scenario. For example, time delay between costs and benefits
can result in short-term policy focusing on only one side of the
ledger, which Eric Biber has shown to be a significant factor in
the backlash against mitigation policy as people today are unwilling to spend for the benefits of mitigation not experienced
166
until well into the future. General ignorance about the connection between short-term behavior and long-term outcome,
such as widespread lack of understanding about how fossil fuel
combustion leads to climate change and what the actual risks
167
of climate change are, can also lead to social traps. A sliding
reinforcer trap occurs when initial desirable outcomes of a certain behavior produce a positive feedback leading to oversupply
of the behavior, such as how the benefits of consuming widely
available, low-cost fossil fuels lead to more and more consump168
tion. An externality trap occurs when, as in the prisoner’s di161. Robert Costanza, Social Traps and Environmental Policy, 37 BIOSCIsocial trap theory, see J.G. CROSS
and John Platt, Social Traps, 28

ENCE 407, 408 (1987). For seminal works on
& MELVIN J. GUYER, SOCIAL TRAPS (1980),
AM. PSYCHOL. 641 (1973).

162. Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09 (explaining how both these examples fit the social trap model).
163. See id. at 407–08 (giving examples).
164. See Rachlinski, supra note 124, at 300 (describing social traps through
cognitive psychology theories and concluding that “[o]ne can scarcely find a
contemporary problem that better fits the definition of a social trap than global climate change”).
165. See Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09 (taxonomy of social traps).
166. See Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, supra note 122.
167. See Costanza, supra note 161, at 408–09.
168. See id.
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lemma game, individuals mistakenly believe they can pass the
costs of their behavior onto others, only to find they suffer the
consequences as well, which amply describes how nations are
169
approaching global solutions to climate change. Finally, a collective trap occurs when, as in the tragedy of the commons, individually rational short-term behavior leads to long-term collective downfall, which is quite obviously at the root of the
170
climate change problem.
Now consider how much more reinforcement climate
change winners would inject into these climate change social
traps as they weigh in on climate policy. First, by focusing attention on their short-term gains they further dissociate current policy from future outcomes (time delay trap). Second,
their focus on current benefits exhibits ignorance about how
benefits are likely over the long run to shift around and eventually diminish over the landscape (ignorance trap). Third, by
pointing to benefits of climate change they suggest that more
benefits will follow from more climate change (sliding reinforcer
trap). Fourth, they act as if the externalities of climate change
are shared only by the losers, whereas eventually the progression of climate change will strip them of their own benefits (externality trap). Finally, although winners are behaving perfectly rationally in seeking to secure their benefits by scaling back
mitigation policy, the global long-term result is disastrous (collective trap).
As bad as this appears, the climate change winners social
trap is particularly devious because it could be baited and set
subtly through the well-intentioned use of cost-benefit analysis
in the IAMs that are being employed and debated widely in
climate policy. Climate change winners will not have to dominate policy-making in order to fuel the climate change social
trap, but rather need only to succeed in having their benefits
more robustly defined and incorporated into IAM cost-benefit
analyses, which is squarely within their interests to advocate.
The result of doing so for each generation of climate change
winners will be a cost-benefit outcome which, while likely still
tilting to the loss side at macro scales, is systematically softened by the rigorous inclusion of benefits. In other words, the
policy vector might still be in the direction of adopting mitigation measures, but the strength of the vector will be weakened
as climate change benefits are accounted for.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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Climate change winners will argue that, strictly speaking,
this weakened mitigation policy vector reflects a more accurate
cost-benefit analysis. They would be correct, and therein lies
the social trap. By softening the case for mitigation throughout
the run of time, climate change winners will incrementally reduce the intensity of mitigation policy indefinitely, which in the
long term is likely to extend climate change. Less mitigation intensity at any point in time means less climate stabilization at
later points in time, which means a longer time before climate
stabilizes at acceptable levels.
The response one might make to this observation is that it
will all work out over time. In other words, by basing mitigation policy at all times on robust cost-benefit analysis that accounts for all climate change and mitigation harms and benefits projected from present into the future, climate policy will
ensure efficiency throughout time and lead to the optimum configuration of greenhouse gas concentrations for the optimum
climate stabilization profile. If climate does not stabilize over
time to satisfactory levels, the argument goes, benefits will
erode and become a less influential factor in the analysis, thus
justifying more aggressive mitigation measures to get climate
stabilization back on the right track. This line of reasoning, of
course, is the underpinning of the “go slow” approach to mitiga171
tion policy, and many climate change winners can be expected to be all on board with this way of thinking as a justification for not supporting mitigation policies.
There are several serious problems with this reasoning, all
of which stem from the significant time delays associated with
climate change. Both climate-destabilizing emissions and climate-stabilizing emission reductions work their effects over
long periods of time. To produce reliable policy prescriptions,
the cost-benefit analysis must be capable of producing accurate
projections of future cost and benefit profiles of different mitigation policy alternatives. The reliability of climate models,
however, falls off the further out into the future and the small172
er the scale. The long-term end of the cost-benefit analysis,
therefore, dissolves the more distant the projection horizon.
171. See supra note 7.
172. See Kerr, supra note 72, at 173 (explaining the uncertainties in largescale models that feed uncertainty into smaller-scale models, such that
“[s]witching from global models to models focusing on a single region creates a
more detailed forecast, but it also ‘piles uncertainty on top of uncertainty’”).
For further explanation of why this is so, see infra Part III.B.2.
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One technique to make this problem drop out of the picture
is to set discount rates sufficiently high to make the future irrelevant in the cost-benefit analysis, leaving short-term costs
173
and benefits as the policy drivers. Even a hefty sum of money
two hundred years into the future is worth very little when discounted to present value using a constant positive compounded
discount rate. Economist Martin Weitzman has described why
174
this “notorious issue of how to discount the distant future” is
especially problematic in the climate change policy context:
The effects of global warming and climate change will be spread out
over centuries and even millennia from now. The logic of compounding a constant positive interest rate forces us to say that what one
might conceptualize as monumental—even earth-shaking—events,
such as disastrous climate change, do not much matter when they occur in the deep future. Perhaps even more disturbing, when exponential discounting is extended over very long time periods there is a truly extraordinary dependence of [cost-benefit analysis] on the choice of
a discount rate. Seemingly insignificant differences in discount rates
can make an enormous difference in the present discounted value of
distant future payoffs. In many long-run situations, almost any answer to a [cost-benefit analysis] question can be defended by one or
another particular choice of a discount rate. This is true in general,
but it is an especially acute problem when distant future events like
climate change (especially catastrophic climate change) are being dis175
counted.

Even putting aside the practical and ethical problems of
setting discount rates high enough to paint future generations
176
out of the picture, this approach has the added flaw of assuming that climate policy can move on a dime and with it so too
will climate. As experience has demonstrated, however, even in
173. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 141, at 1097 (“[W]hen regulators
use cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the desirability of climate change mitigation, one factor typically determines whether mitigation is justified: the discount rate, the rate at which future benefits [of mitigation] are converted to
their present value.”).
174. Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 283 (2011) [hereinafter Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty].
175. Id. at 283–84.
176. See Revesz & Shahabian, supra note 141, at 1120–32 (discussing the
moral implications of discounting the future). Using low discount rates or zero
rates is not without controversy either. See Dieter Helm, Climate-Change Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 211, 228–
30 (2008) (discussing the ramifications of using low rates); Ferenc L. Toth,
Discounting in Integrated Assessments of Climate Change, 23 ENERGY POL’Y
403 (1995) (explaining that using high rates obscures distant losses but using
low rates would be inconsistent with other policy methods). For these reasons
“[c]ontroversies involving the discount rate have been central to global warming models and policy for many years.” Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 43.
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the event that climate change benefits begin to diminish over
time in iterations of short-term cost-benefit analyses, moving
policy in line with shifting projections can be a formidable challenge. In any case, even if policy can shift quickly to align with
new cost-benefit analyses, the climate stabilization benefits will
not be experienced until several generations hence. Saying one
day that we need to invest more in climate stabilization does
not produce climate stabilization the next day, or even perhaps
the next century.
One might argue in response that as the demand for climate stabilization increases the market will produce ever more
effective techniques and technologies capable of making rapid
adjustments to global climate conditions. Whatever climate adjustments cannot be managed on a short-term basis, moreover,
can be managed through efficient, rapidly deployable adaptation measures. Climate policy, in other words, will begin to look
like food policy, health care policy, or any other policy, riding
along on iterations of short-term cost-benefit analyses and relying on the efficient market and rapid policy responses to make
the adjustments needed to maintain efficient cost-benefit outcomes perpetually into the future. There will be minor bumps
along the way as the need for and implementation of market
and policy adjustments experience short timing mismatches,
but on average everything will happen as planned—climate
will be adjusted at just the right time, to just the right conditions, at just the right cost, forever. The climate change winners social trap is solved!
Clearly, anyone making these arguments must rely on a
set of assumptions that, taken together, are fantastical: that
physical and economic models of climate change allow reliable
projections well into the future; that discount rates are appropriate to apply far into the future; that policy can and will adjust quickly as cost-benefit analyses change; that the market
will produce technologies capable of efficiently and significantly
shortening the time delay between policy adjustments and climate stabilization benefits; and that efficient, rapidly deployed
adaptation measures will manage unavoidable, inefficient
harms during any residual gap between market and policy ad177
justments and their climate stabilization benefits. But let us
177. Entertaining these assumptions allows some fascinating thought experiments on how global geopolitics would respond. Given how much international friction there is today over climate policy when the benefits of mitigation efforts might not be felt for centuries, one can imagine how international
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revel in the sheer arrogance needed to entertain this fiction as
reality—let us assume all of this could magically come true—
and the social trap remains baited nonetheless. The hitch in
this argument—and it is a very big hitch—is that it relies on
the additional assumption that climate change is linear, reversible, and conventional in its uncertainty and risk profiles,
whereas most likely none of these conditions is true.
B. HEDGING AGAINST NONLINEARITY, TIPPING POINTS, AND
FAT-TAILED RISKS
No dose of hubris is enough to overcome the constraints on
our understanding of climate dynamics as global temperatures
continue rising. At the global level, one significant limitation
for modeling projection accuracy is the obvious fact that we
have no experience with a global climate operating at temperatures like those predicted, and the higher they rise the more
acute this uncertainty becomes. In short, “[o]nce the world has
warmed by 4°C, conditions will be so different from anything
we can observe today (and still more different from the last ice
age) that it is inherently hard to say when the warming will
178
stop.”
This prediction constraint stems from the observed fact
that climate change is not linear. Rather, as temperatures rise
on average, positive and negative feedback effects will eventually be triggered that could amplify or impede further warming.
Melting tundra, for example, releases greenhouse gases previously locked in the frozen formations, and researchers have
found this effect is far exceeding expected levels because of its
feedback properties: as the greenhouse gases are released, they
contribute to warming that melts the tundra faster, which re179
leases more greenhouse gases more rapidly, and so on. The
relations would respond if it truly were possible to manipulate the global climate system over short time frames.
178. Myles R. Allen & David J. Frame, Call Off the Quest, 318 SCIENCE
582, 582 (2007); see also Benjamin M. Sanderson et al., The Response of the
Climate System to Very High Greenhouse Gas Emission Scenarios, ENVTL.
RES. LETTERS, July 5, 2011, at 4–9 (discussing climate responses to unabated
greenhouse gas emissions).
179. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling from Northern Lakes:
Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1657, 1671 (2007); K.M. Walter et al., Methane
Bubbling from Siberian Thaw Lakes as a Positive Feedback to Climate Warming, 443 NATURE 71, 71 (2006). This effect is believed to have played a significant role in the last deglaciation. See K.M. Walter et al., Thermokarst Lakes as
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scientific literature exploring these complex dynamics and exposing our lack of understanding about what lies ahead as
180
temperature rises is legion, and yet still we do not have a
firm grasp of how the feedback systems will work as tempera181
tures rise.
Scientists also believe many of these transformations will
be irreversible once conditions pass thresholds. The melting of
the tundra, for example, “could be a one-way ticket,” as once
melted the tundra cannot recompose itself should climate ever
182
return former tundra areas to permafrost conditions. The
problem is that while we know there is a high probability of
crossing such tipping points and venturing irreversibly into
new climate states, we do not know when we will cross them; in
fact, we likely will not know until long after that we have
183
crossed one. That is the nature of environmental nonlinearity
184
and tipping points.
a Source of Atmospheric CH4 During the Last Deglaciation, 318 SCIENCE 633,
633 (2007).
180. See Robert A. Washington-Allen et al., Introduction to Special Feature
on Catastrophic Thresholds, Perspectives, Definitions, and Applications, 15
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 38 (2010), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/
vol15/iss3/art38.
181. See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, THRESHOLDS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS (Colleen W. Charles ed., 2009), available at
http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-2/final-report/default.htm (examining numerous positive feedback properties leading to nonlinear thresholds in climate change dynamics); Almut Arneth et al., Clean the Air, Heat the
Planet?, 326 SCIENCE 672, 673 (2009) (examining the feedback effects between
conventional air pollution control and climate change mitigation, concluding
that complex positive and negative feedback links exist and that, on balance,
the evidence and models suggest that “[a]ir pollution control will accelerate
warming in the coming decades”); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate
Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE
1444 (2008) (explaining the complex and nonlinear forest-climate interactions); I. Eisenman & J.S. Wettlauferet al., Nonlinear Threshold Behavior
During the Loss of Arctic Sea Ice, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 28 (2009) (describing the nonlinear “tipping points” in the ice-albedo feedback effect); Jerome Gaillardet & Albert Galy, Himalaya—Carbon Sink or Source?, 320 SCIENCE 1727 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of the sinks and sources of the
carbon geological cycle); Steven W. Running, Ecosystem Disturbance, Carbon,
and Climate, 321 SCIENCE 652 (2008) (explaining the uncertainties of ecological sinks and sources such as fires and insect epidemics).
182. John Bohannon, The Big Thaw Reaches Mongolia’s Pristine North,
319 SCIENCE 567, 568 (2008). Researchers believe there is a strong potential
for similar nonlinear change effects throughout the world’s peatlands. See
Nancy B. Dise, Peatland Response to Global Change, 326 SCIENCE 810 (2009).
183. See generally Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment
of Tipping Points in the Climate System, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5041
(2009); Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Points in the Earth’s Climate Sys-
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Moreover, given how severe runaway climate change is
likely to be for humanity and ecosystems eventually, the uncertainty and risk profiles on the other side of climate tipping
points are potentially loaded with catastrophic problems that
185
defy the conventional bell-shaped probability curves. Basically, we do not really know what will happen, but we do know
some very bad things could happen. Obviously, such “fat-tailed”
186
extreme event probabilities, if they are locked in by crossing
key climate system tipping points, make the consequences of
getting the policy wrong quite severe. As Carolyn Kousky and
Roger Cooke of Resources for the Future argue, the greatest
downside of relying on conventional risk analysis in the climate
change policy context thus stems from what they describe as
the “unholy trinity” of fat tails, tail dependence, and microcorrelations:
These are distinct aspects of loss distributions, such as damages from
a disaster or insurance claims. With fat-tailed losses, the probability
declines slowly, relative to the severity of the loss. Tail dependence is
that propensity of dependence to concentrate in the tails, such that
severe losses are more likely to happen together. Micro-correlations
are negligible correlations between risks which may be individually
harmless, but very dangerous when aggregated. These three phenomena—types of catastrophic and dependent risks—undermine tradi187
tional approaches to risk management.
tem, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1786 (2008); Johan Rockström et al., A Safe
Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472 (2009).
184. See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., ADVISORY COMM. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH &
EDUC., TRANSITIONS AND TIPPING POINTS IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 28–31 (2009), available at http://www.nsf.gov/geo/ere/ereweb/ac-ere/
nsf6895_ere_report_090809.pdf.
185. See Weitzman, A Review of the Stern Review, supra note 6; Weitzman,
Fat-Tailed Uncertainty, supra note 174.
186. A tail event is an outcome that should happen only extremely infrequently given normal probability distributions based on historical event frequencies. As the tail of the probability distribution grows “fatter” the likelihood of a tail event rises. See Nordhaus, supra note 6, at 50. For a concise and
accessible explanation of fat-tailed risks in climate change policy contexts generally, see Melinda Kimble & Letha Tawney, The Tale of the Fat Tail, ENVTL.
F., May–June 2009, at 24.
187. Carolyn Kousky & Roger M. Cooke, The Unholy Trinity: Fat Tails,
Tail Dependence, and Micro-Correlations 1 (Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 09-36-REV, 2009). Aggregated micro-correlations have been
described as leading to the “Jenga effect,” after the game in which players
stack pieces into a tower and then remove them, one by one, stacking the removed pieces on the top of the tower. With skilled players, the structure can
stay standing for quite a while, but at some point one more piece removed or
stacked on top leads to a sudden crash of the entire structure. Food web dynamics exhibit this effect. Peter C. de Ruiter et al., Food Web Ecology: Playing
Jenga and Beyond, 309 SCIENCE 68, 68 (2005).
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Legal scholars are beginning to recognize the serious challenges nonlinearity, tipping points, and fat-tailed risk effects in
the climate change system pose for using IAM cost-benefit
analysis as our primary climate policy calibration instru188
ment. The assumption that cost-benefit analysis can pick up
on changing climate conditions and seamlessly feed this new
information into markets and the policy world for rapid corrective responses is, quite simply, blown apart once the prospect of
crossing unpredictable, irreversible, potentially game-changing
189
thresholds is factored into the picture. I cannot sum up this
problem more concisely and compellingly than Weitzman does
in his work critiquing IAM-style cost-benefit analysis of climate
mitigation policy:
[T]he economics of climate change consists of a very long chain of
tenuous inferences fraught with big uncertainties in every link: beginning with unknown base-case GHG emissions; compounded by big
uncertainties about how available policies and policy levers will affect
actual GHG emissions; compounded by big uncertainties about how
GHG flow emissions accumulate via the carbon cycle into GHG stock
concentrations; compounded by big uncertainties about how and
when GHG stock concentrations translate into global average temperature changes; compounded by big uncertainties about how global
average temperature changes decompose into specific changes in regional weather patterns; compounded by big uncertainties about how
adaptations to, and mitigations of, climate change damages at a regional level are translated into regional utility changes via an appropriate “damages function”; compounded by big uncertainties about
how future regional utility changes are aggregated into a worldwide
utility function and what its overall degree of risk aversion should be;
compounded by big uncertainties about what discount rate should be
used to convert everything into expected present discounted values.
The result of this lengthy cascading of big uncertainties is a reduced
form of truly extraordinary uncertainty about the aggregate welfare
impacts of catastrophic climate change, which is represented mathe-

188. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 43–
58 (2004); Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics: Implications for
the Theory and Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53,
56–57, 77–78 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 926–27
(2011); Ruhl, supra note 18, at 416–23; Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan
A. Gilligan, Macro-Risks: The Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 21
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 401, 402–07 (2011).
189. The additional assumption one might make to support using costbenefit analysis, that we can “learn that catastrophe is impending fast enough
to make a sufficiently quick and vigorous global response to head off the possibility,” also seems “excessively optimistic.” Farber, supra note 188, at 943
n.189.
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matically by a [probability density function] that is spread out and
190
heavy with probability in the tails.

Hence, resting as it must on the unrealistic set of assumptions outlined above and exposing us as it does to tipping points
the other side of which is a virtual abyss of uncertainty, but
likely catastrophe, it seems particularly risky to use IAM-style
cost-benefit analysis as our primary mitigation policy com191
pass. While I do not profess to know the right global surface
temperature or atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
to set as policy targets, it seems far more prudent to hedge
against nonlinearity, tipping points, and fat-tailed risks by designing policy goals and time lines through scientific models ra190. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty, supra note 174, at 284–85. In his
survey of IAM models through 2011, Nordhaus observes that “[t]here has been
virtually no work applying Weitzman’s insights in empirical IAMs.” Nordhaus,
supra note 6, at 50. Since Nordhaus’s assessment, however, researchers at the
Center for Robust Decision Making on Climate and Energy Policy have developed dynamic IAM models integrating stochastic tipping point parameters for
climate change based on climate experts’ subjective opinions about the likelihood of various climate tipping point catastrophes, such as changes in the
North Atlantic thermo-haline circulation or massive permafrost melting. See
Thomas S. Lontzek et al., Tipping Points in a Dynamic Stochastic IAM 3, 6–11
(RDCEP Working Paper No. 12-03, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1992660. They consider their dynamic stochastic modeling approach “inevitable for an appropriate analysis of abrupt climate change with permanent
and significant damage over a large time horizon.” Id. at 13.
191. It is, of course, possible that the analytic capacity of IAM models can
be vastly improved. However, they necessarily will have to rely on modeler
opinion (or the modeler’s interpretation of other expert opinions) for defining
when tipping points will occur, what triggers them, and what lies on the other
side. See Lontzek, supra note 190, at 6–9 (explaining the use of expert elicitation to calibrate the likelihood, damage, and permanence of tipping point catastrophes in an IAM model using dynamic stochastic methods). Having never
experienced a climate system like the one such IAMs must model, however,
researchers have little to go on. For example, ecologists now warn of the noanalog future—ecological variability unprecedented in the history of ecology,
riddled with nonlinear feedback and feed-forward loops, previously unknown
emergent properties, and new thresholds of irreversible change. Matthew C.
Fitzpatrick & William W. Hargrove, The Projection of Species Distribution
Models and the Problem of Non-Analog Climate, 18 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 2255, 2255 (2009) (“By 2100, a quarter or more of the Earth’s land surface may experience climatic conditions that have no modern analog . . . .”);
Douglas Fox, Back to the No-Analog Future?, 316 SCIENCE 823, 823 (2007)
(“[I]f the climate changes over the next 100 years as current models predict,
surviving species throughout much of Earth’s land area . . . are likely to be reshuffled into novel ecosystems unknown today.”); Douglas Fox, When Worlds
Collide, CONSERVATION, Jan.–Mar. 2007, at 28–30 (arguing that it is likely
that the world will enter into a no-analog future within 100–200 years). If
there is no scientific basis for reliably describing a future scenario that lies on
the other side of climate tipping points, there is nothing reliably to plug into
an IAM.

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS

269

ther than through economic models, at which time costeffectiveness analysis should guide how we go about achieving
those targets.
V. ADAPTATION POLICY: EMBRACE CLIMATE CHANGE
WINNERS
The adaptation policy I have used as the reference point for
this Article is one of pursuing harm-preventing adaptive
measures. Unlike the mitigation policy analysis, however, adaptation policy should work in just the opposite direction to
embrace rather than ignore winners’ interests. The distribution
of climate change harms and benefits will shift around the
landscape gradually over the next several centuries, meaning
benefits will be relatively stable in a given area for relevant
personal and public infrastructure planning horizons. For example, an agricultural area enjoying longer growing seasons
and beneficial increased precipitation may seek to invest in irrigation and drainage infrastructure, or a shipping business
benefitting from improved transport routes in the Arctic may
demand public investment in improved navigation infrastruc192
ture. In all likelihood the time frame for investment, construction, use, and depletion of such infrastructure investments
often will fit within the relevant time frames of the rise and
193
possible eventual erosion of the associated climate benefits.
Where that is the case, there are strong adaptation policy reasons to facilitate private and public investment in infrastructure designed to harness and deliver climate change benefits
that reduce vulnerability and increase resilience to climate
194
change harms.
Adaptation to climate change impacts will leverage these
two different but closely related strategies focused on deflecting
192. See Ho, supra note 50, at 714 –15 (explaining that enabling vessels to
take advantage of new routes opening up in the melting Arctic will require
improved capacities in local environmental monitoring and forecasting, search
and rescue, and traffic routing, as well as in ship technology).
193. See generally IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note
123 (describing the relationship between climate change and changing infrastructure needs, and noting that some major updates are already underway).
194. Vulnerability refers to “[t]he degree to which a system is susceptible
to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate
variability and extremes,” and resilience refers to “[a] capability to anticipate,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from significant multihazard threats with
minimum damage to social well-being, the economy, and the environment.”
INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 2.
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and recovering from the blows of climate change. Many human communities and ecological landscapes will require a mix
of these strategies to make effective use of available technologi196
cal, financial, human, social, and natural adaptation capital,
and many benefit-securing adaptation measures would contribute to both strategies. Helping climate change winners secure their benefits, in other words, can help climate change losers as well.
A. VULNERABILITY-REDUCING BENEFITS
Vulnerability to climate change harms can be reduced by
improving the reliability of infrastructure and other mechanisms designed to shield human communities and ecosystems
from the harmful effects of climate change, such as by constructing sea walls to protect coastal areas or limiting new development permits on coasts likely to experience sea level
197
rise. If the risks associated with vulnerability can be reduced
through such methods, less harm will be sustained and less
capital will need to be deployed to recover from the effects of
climate change.
Investment in benefit-securing adaptations can support
vulnerability-reducing policies. Some infrastructure supporting
climate change winners, such as improved water management
systems in areas where some people and businesses will benefit
195. See IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 123, at
720 (“Adaptation to climate change takes place through adjustments to reduce
vulnerability or enhance resilience in response to observed or expected changes in climate and associated extreme weather events.”); John Handmer & Stephen Dovers, A Typology of Resilience: Rethinking Institutions for Sustainable
Development, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 152, at 187, 196 (“These two approaches are best seen as
extremes; in a complex society there is likely to be—and should be—a mixture
of the two in any given situation and across institutions.”); Nathan Hultman,
Worth More than Good Advice: Lessons of Hurricane Katrina for Development
in a Changing Climate, 11 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 47, 49–50 (2005–06) (noting
several concrete adaptation strategies that have been gleaned from the example of Hurricane Katrina).
196. Blending the two strategies together is often described under the label
of “adaptive capacity.” See, e.g., IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY,
supra note 123, at 727–30; Brian H. Hurd, Challenges of Adapting to a Changing Climate, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77, 81 (2007–08).
197. See, e.g., JONATHAN ENSOR & RACHEL BERGER, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACHES
13–16, 164 –65 (2009); P. Mick Kelly & W. Neil Adger, Theory and Practice in
Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change and Facilitating Adaptation, in
THE EARTHSCAN READER ON ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note
152, at 161, 162–74.
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from increased precipitation, can help protect other people in
the area who might face risks such as flooding. Focusing just on
the flooding risk might result in less effective responses than
would be the case were the policy designed to capitalize as well
on the benefits. For one thing, climate change winners are more
likely to support such projects where at least some of the effect,
intentional or incidental, is to secure them their benefits.
Moreover, facilitating the delivery and security of climate
change benefits can strengthen local economies, providing a
deeper and more secure base from which to finance vulnerability-reducing adaptations. Indeed, as winners and losers may often live side-by-side in many communities, the winners’ prosperity could incidentally enhance local capacity for investment
in vulnerability-reducing adaptations. Climate change winners
are only winners on net—they will not be immune to all of the
adverse effects of climate change and thus will support vulnerability-reducing adaptations that protect their communities.
In short, if farmers in an area experiencing longer growing
seasons and more favorable precipitation regimes will not be
able to take advantage of those benefits without improved water management infrastructure, or if shipping companies cannot take advantage of newly opened waters without new navigation infrastructure, it makes little sense to decline public
investment in the necessary infrastructure simply because it
would be helping climate change winners. Rather, the prudent
public investment policy would be to evaluate how helping the
winners helps reduce the vulnerability of the losers. Nor would
it make sense to erect barriers to private investment in benefitsecuring adaptations simply because it is about winners helping themselves. A company that benefits through its climate
proofing technological innovations is necessarily assisting the
harm-reducing adaptations of others. A comprehensive adaptation policy, therefore, would include significant attention to defining climate change benefits and identifying opportunities to
leverage public and private investments in benefit-securing adaptations as opportunities to promote vulnerability-reducing
adaptations.
B. RESILIENCE-ENHANCING BENEFITS
Not all the risks of climate change can be mitigated by reducing vulnerability, as costs, technological constraints, lack of
knowledge, and mistaken assumptions will limit vulnerabilityreducing capacity. The other strategy thus focuses on recover-
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ing from the blow of climate change by enhancing resilience to
impacts, such as through improved emergency response tech198
niques and habitat restoration methods.
Here again, investments in benefit-securing adaptations
can help improve overall resilience to climate change. For example, areas that prosper as a result of climate change can
serve as refuges in times when other areas suffer catastrophic
climate system events. Even in prospering areas, moreover,
some adverse climate change effects will necessitate enhanced
resilience capacity. Farmers in some regions, for example, may
be balancing the benefits of more precipitation (e.g., reduced irrigation costs) with the risks (e.g., increased flooding). That
they may be net winners does not mean they face no exposure
to losses.
Winners everywhere will want to ensure their communities
are resilient to climate change, and thus will support investments in resilience-enhancing adaptations. Supporting their
benefit-securing adaptations thus helps them promote community-wide resilience. A comprehensive adaptation policy, therefore, would include significant attention to defining climate
change benefits and identifying opportunities to leverage public
and private investments in benefit-securing adaptations as opportunities to promote overall resilience-enhancing adaptation
policy.
VI. ENSURING WINNERS SECURE NO PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Mitigation and adaptation are distinct but related climate
policy objectives—the more efficient and effective we are at one,
the less pressure there is on the other, though it seems inevitable we will need both. It is by no means inconsistent, therefore,
to ignore climate change winners for purposes of mitigation policy and simultaneously embrace them for purposes of adaptation policy. One danger that lurks in the second prong of this
approach, however, arises if climate change winners begin to
treat their benefits and the private and public investments in
them as property rights subject to some level of protection. As
one adaptation policy scholar has observed, “[t]he challenge will
be in the balance between achieving essential adaptation outcomes, respecting existing property rights, and avoiding the
198. See ENSOR & BERGER, supra note 197, at 17–25; Handmer & Dovers,
supra note 195, at 190–204.
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creation of compensable rights under future regulatory re199
gimes.”
For example, although mitigation policy would ignore winners for purposes of its design, as mitigation begins to gain
traction on greenhouse gas concentrations current and prospective winners might argue that they are entitled to compensation for reduced streams of benefits. Similarly, as public adaptation investment policy adapts to evolving local and regional
climate regimes, some infrastructure supported in the past
might be abandoned or curtailed, the beneficiaries of which
might seek compensation. Whether winners would have any legal basis for compensation in the future is a question climate
policymakers should anticipate now, as steps can be taken at
the front end of climate change to ensure no property rights accrue in the future benefits of climate change. Legal doctrine
and institutions can begin to lay this groundwork by establishing baselines for reasonable private expectations and by placing
clear conditions on the benefits of public adaptation infrastructure.
A. ESTABLISHING BASELINES FOR REASONABLE PRIVATE
EXPECTATIONS
Climate change winners are likely to make significant investments to secure and maintain their benefits. Passive winners, for example, will invest in the added capital needed to
continue working in longer growing and outdoor construction
seasons. Adaptive winners will invest in the new capital needed
to shift to different crops or production lines. Opportunistic
winners most of all will lay out significant investments to seize
on their stream of benefits. All of these winners’ investments
will have been predicated on the anticipated effects of climate
change. In other words, they are backing their investments—
they believe reasonably—on an expectation of climate change.
It is obvious where this is leading: among other strategies,
climate change winners will resist government-led efforts to
deprive them of their secured benefits, whether through mitigation or adaptation, as unconstitutional takings of property
200
without just compensation. A central element in any such
claim, however, is that the claimant demonstrates that the
199. Jan McDonald, The Role of Law in Adapting to Climate Change, 2
CLIMATE CHANGE 283, 287 (2011).
200. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”).
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government is interfering with “distinct investment-backed ex201
pectations.” Indeed, this “notion of investment-backed expectations . . . is increasingly being regarded as a prime determi202
nant of what constitutes ‘property’ itself.” Climate change
winners are sure to argue that their benefit-securing investments were based on reasonable investment-backed expectations and thus should not be diminished through government
mitigation and adaptation policies.
There are two core problems with any such claim. First, as
explained above, climate change winners cannot expect their
benefits to outlast climate change itself. If the government were
to adopt no mitigation policies, letting climate change run unabated, many if not most climate change benefits enjoyed in a
particular area will eventually fade away, swamped by the
gradual amplification of offsetting harms. Climate change itself
is thus the irrefutable rebuttal to reasonable investment203
backed expectations in climate change benefits.
But more to the point, climate change winners cannot
claim reasonable investment-backed expectations when they
know all along that the primary climate policy goal is to mitigate and adapt. As courts have explained, the “regulatory climate,” of which property owners are expected to be aware, can
defeat claims of reasonable investment-backed expectations
when those investments are clearly not consonant with the pol204
icy direction.
Climate change winners could hardly claim
surprise in this sense when mitigation policies finally begin to
gain traction on climate stabilization and alter the trajectory
and distribution of climate change harms and benefits. Property doctrines such as the public trust also could evolve so as to
preclude takings claims relating to resources necessary to pub205
lic climate change adaptation.
201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
202. Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 437 (2000).
203. Several commentators have observed that this effect will defeat takings claims by coastal property owners. See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and
Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 627 (2010); Margaret E.
Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property Rights: The Public Trust
Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 59
(2011); Thomas Ruppert, Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations: Should
Notice of Rising Seas Lead to Falling Expectations for Coastal Property Purchasers?, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 239, 259 (2011).
204. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
205. See Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential

2012]

CLIMATE CHANGE WINNERS

275

Hence, rather than ignoring climate change benefits and
their beneficiaries, climate policy should fully recognize their
presence, allow private benefit-securing investments to flourish, and loudly trumpet that mitigation and adaptation policies
are designed to intervene in the profile of climate change harms
and benefits across the landscape. The policy, in other words, is
explicitly about changing who wins and who loses from climate
change—the idea of course being to reduce the severity of
harms. Thus, no person or business has a reasonable expectation of always maintaining benefits received or even of staying
on a winner trajectory. Meanwhile, adaptation policy should
feed into property doctrine to ensure it evolves in favor of defeating takings claims grounded in resources vital to protection
of public trust resources and other resources associated with
climate change adaptations needed to protect public health and
critical environmental resources. The regulatory and judicial
climate thus can directly engage climate change winners and
make it abundantly clear that their private benefit-securing investments are taken on at their own risk. Legal scholars can
supply much of the advanced theoretical and doctrinal design
work supporting this approach.
B. CONDITIONING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN BENEFITS
As noted above, my suggested policy approach involves
government pursuing aggressive mitigation policy alongside
government investing in benefit-securing adaptations that reduce community-wide vulnerability and enhance communitywide resilience. Just as many direct and indirect beneficiaries
of public infrastructure investments challenge decisions to cur206
tail those benefits, when climate change winners see mitigation policy eroding the publicly provided infrastructure around
which they have based their private lives, they may seek takings compensation. This potential, however, is easy to manage
through clear legislative statements that all public investment
in climate adaptation infrastructure, whether harm-reducing or
benefit-securing, creates no rights, title, interest, or estate in or
to the public infrastructure or its incidental benefits. The apt
Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 846–50
(2010).
206. For example, irrigation districts and municipalities frequently have
sued federal water management agencies when the agencies alter water allocation from reservoir and reclamation projects. See, e.g., In re MDL-1824 TriState Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 2011); Klamath
Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 508–09 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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analogy comes from permits and licenses the government issues to private interests for use of and gain from public lands.
The Taylor Grazing Act, for example, provides that issuance of
grazing permits on public lands “shall not create any right, ti207
tle, interest, or estate in or to the [public] lands,” and the Supreme Court has held that the increment of value added to a
private ranch by a public land grazing permit is not a compen208
sable private property interest.”
Once again, therefore, it is important for climate policy
now to fully recognize that there are climate change benefits
and beneficiaries, including beneficiaries of public adaptation
investments. From its very inception, climate policy should focus on building the case against the idea that climate change
winners have any property right interests in benefits secured
or maintained directly or indirectly by public investments in
adaptation infrastructure. All legislation, regulations, and government contracting dealing with public climate change adaptation investments, therefore, should explicitly detail the core
legal principle that public financial or other support of adaptation projects creates no compensable property interests in the
public infrastructure or its incidental private benefits.
CONCLUSION
Talking about climate change winners makes me uncomfortable, but not nearly as uncomfortable as I become when I
think what could happen if we do not talk about them. Millions
of people and thousands of businesses and communities in the
United States stand to reap benefits from climate change, and
they will undoubtedly factor their beneficiary status into their
positions on climate policy. Ignoring this substantial policy dynamic, which is only decades away from coming on line across
the nation, cannot possibly be the prudent policy approach.
Rather, we must study the benefits of climate change—their
sources, their flows, their economic and social proportions, their
life cycles, and their beneficiaries—every bit as intensely as we
are attempting to do with respect to climate change harms. We
must be ready to counter efforts that climate change winners
might make to soften mitigation policies, but we should also be
ready to make public investments, and facilitate private investments, in benefit-securing adaptations that promote overall
207. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2006).
208. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973).
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adaptation policy goals. Most of all, we should begin now to
build the legal framework for rebutting any claims that climate
change benefits, however secured, are protected property
rights. Leaving all of this work for later, when the climate
change winners are firmly entrenched throughout society, the
economy, and politics, will only make the backlash against climate policy that is already more than evident all the more difficult to overcome.

